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I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine the following example of a typical asset protection
minded individual: a married man with children who has
amassed a good deal of wealth as a successful surgeon. Like
many high-net-worth professionals, he is worried about the
potential of a lawsuit and the devastating effect it would have on
his hard earned fortune.' With no known existing creditors, he
transfers the majority of his assets into a trust created under the
laws of the Cook Islands. 2 His only stated purpose for creating
the trust is to preserve his family's fortune for the benefit of
himself, his wife, and his children. Subsequently, he receives
notice that his medical malpractice insurance will be canceled. As
a result, he decides to switch to a lower risk practice area and
gives up surgery to become a general practitioner.3 However,
even general medicine is not risk free; during the treatment of a
patient he commits medical malpractice. The injured patient
sues and receives a judgment award of $500,000 only to learn
that almost all of the doctor's assets are located in an offshore
trust.4 Cook Islands law does not recognize U.S. judgments, so

1.
See generally Charles M. Bruce et al., Protectionof Assets Trusts: Fallout
from Litigation Explosion, N.Y. L. J., Sept. 13, 1991, at 1 (discussing the classic
situation of a well-to-do settlor who feels at risk of a lawsuit perhaps because of
lingering liability from a prior contract or the nature of his business).
2.
The Cook Islands are located 1,900 miles off the coast of New Zealand.
See Debra Baker, Island Castaway, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998 at 54, 55 (explaining how
offshore trusts can have the effect of defrauding the spouse of a settlor and
leaving the spouse with no remedy).
3.
This hypothetical is loosely based on facts found in a Florida case
involving debtor-creditor rights. See generally Hurlbert v. Shackleton, 560 So. 2d
1276, 1277-78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). However, that case did not involve the
use of an offshore trust. See id.
4.
The rest of his assets are held in joint tenancy by the entireties with
his wife and therefore not subject to satisfying the judgment.
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the victim cannot enforce this judgment against the assets
located in trust.5
Unlike most states in the United States, the Cook Islands do
allow the creator of a trust to be a trust beneficiary and to
exercise a certain degree of control over the disposition of the
trust. This means that the doctor may receive payments of
income from the same trust assets that are unavailable to satisfy
the victim's judgment--essentially he gets the best of both worlds.
This result seems unfair to the unsatisfied victim.
This outcome does not resonate well with what has
traditionally been the well-settled principle of U.S. law that one
should not be able to benefit from and control property that is
inaccessible to his creditors. Nonetheless, two states have
modeled their trust laws after this paradigm. Alaska and
Delaware recently passed legislation that may make it possible for
any U.S. citizen to set up a trust in the United States that
achieves benefits previously attainable only through offshore
6

trusts.

For years, U.S. citizens have looked to offshore jurisdictions to
create trusts that protect a settlor's assets from the claims of
7
creditors, yet allow the settlor to be named as a beneficiary.
United States law and public policy have long been against the idea
of allowing a person to enjoy benefits from assets that are
simultaneously shielded from creditors' claims. 8 However, despite

5.
The only way the victim could reach the assets held in the offshore
trust would be by relitigating his claim under the laws of the Cook Islands, a
complicated and expensive proposition.
6.
See generally Richard W. Hompesch II et al., Does the New Alaska
Trusts Act Provide an Alternative to the Foreign Trust?, J. ASSET PROTECTION,
July/Aug. 1997, at 9. Proponents of the Alaska legislation claim that "self settled
trusts can be created under a new Alaska law without subjecting the trust assets
to claims of the grantor's future creditors." Id. See also Jonathan G. Blattmachr
et al., New Alaska Trust Act Provides Many Estate PlanningOpportunities, 24 EST.
PLAN. 347, 347 (1997) (stating that the Alaska Trust Act "allows an individual to
create in Alaska a trust from which the grantor can receive distributions . . .
without exposing the trust to claims of the grantor's creditors").
Jonathan
Blattmachr, co-author of both previously cited articles as well as many others
championing the Alaska Trust Act and a partner in the New York law firm of
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCoy, assisted in drafting the new law. See Katharine
Fraser, With New Law, Alaska Aiming to Be Trust Capital, AM. BANKER, Apr. 21,
1997, at 1. His brother, Douglas Blattmachr, chief executive officer of the Alaska
Trust Co., lobbied to get the law passed by the Alaska legislature. See Brigid
McMenamin, Flimsy Shelters, FORBES, Sept. 8, 1997, at 94.
7.
See Lynn Asinof, Protection of Offshore Trusts Comes Onshore in Two
States, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1997, at C1.
8.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959). The RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS reads:
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this existing public policy, Alaska and Delaware have enacted
statutes that attempt to do just that. 9 Essentially, these statutes
claim to make what used to be possible only offshore, now possible
in the United States.
This Note seeks to show that regardless of whether the new
legislation is effective in protecting assets from creditors, its mere
passage seems to mark a break from long-standing U.S. public
policy against self-settled spendthrift trusts.1 0 This wellestablished policy, reflecting ideas of equity and fairness, dictates
that debtors should use available resources to pay their debts.'1
This policy is most pronounced in situations where people are

able to successfully shield their trust assets from such
involuntary creditors as spouses, children, and tort victims. It
seems that the Alaska and Delaware legislators may be willing to
ignore what is fair to creditors in order to bring money into their
states.1 2 In fact, these legislators may be putting the interests of
their respective states, as well as the interests of wealthy asset
protectors, before the rights of creditors, previously held concepts
of fairness, and what has been the prevailing law in this country.
If estate planners and asset protectors elect to utilize trusts
under these new statutes, Alaska and Delaware stand to be the
depositories of massive amounts of wealth. This will translate
into financial growth in each state through increased business

(1) Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust with a provision
restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of his interest, his
transferee or creditors can reach his interest.
(2) Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust for support or a
discretionary trust, his transferee or creditors can reach the madmum
amount which the trustee under the terms of the trust could pay to him or
apply to his benefit.
Id.
9.
See Hompesch et al., supranote 6, at 15 (claiming that "an individual
is now able to create an Alaska trust of which he or she is a discretionary
beneficiary that will be protected from his or her creditors").
10.
One commentator, on the changing role of trust law, considers the
Alaska and Delaware trusts one of many dramatic reforms reflecting a changed
view of the relationship between creditors and trusts and the resulting
rearrangement of creditors rights. See Joel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and the
Form of the Trust at the New Mllenniurn, or, We Don't Have to Think of England
Anymore, 62 ALB. L. REV. 543, 547, 555, 572 (1998).
11.
See Karen Gebbia-Pinetti, As Certain As Debt and Taxes: Estate
Planning, Asset-Protection Trusts, and Conflicting State Law, in SC60 ADVANCED
ESTATE PLANNING TECHNIQUES 179, 213 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study 1998)
(providing a discussion of the reasons against using spendthrift trusts).
12.
If these trusts become popular they will bring a boom to banks in the
states that act as trustees and the states will benefit. See Fraser, supra note 6, at
1. Alaska State Representative Al Vezey, R-North Pole, the bill's sponsor, stated:
"We are trying to be a business-friendly state; we want economic growth." Id.
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among banks, attorneys, accountants, financial advisors, and any
other professions that will assist clients in establishing and
managing these trusts, the benefits of which will trickle down
throughout each state's economy. 13
Since asset protection is the primary reason U.S. citizens
create offshore trusts, Part II of this Note explains the goals
behind asset protection and how the self-settled spendthrift trust
works to achieve these goals. The policy implications of selfsettled spendthrift trusts will be discussed, as well as the
differences between U.S. law and that of foreign jurisdictions.
Part III examines the background and the structure of the Alaska
and Delaware statutes. Part IV discusses the effectiveness of the
new Alaska and Delaware trusts as asset protectors. This Note
concludes with an analysis of the significance of the shift in U.S.
public policy and a determination that the Alaska and Delaware
statutes do not represent good policy.

II. THE SELF-SETTLED

SPENDTHRIFT TRUST

Prior to the passage of the Alaska and Delaware legislation,
estate planners and asset protection experts generally agreed that
offshore asset protection trusts provided optimum creditor
protection. 1 4 Certain offshore jurisdictions provide such
protection because their laws allow and enforce self-settled
spendthrift trusts, which, until recently, were generally not
enforceable under U.S. law. United States public policy and state
law made it impossible for a settlor to expressly create a trust in
which assets are completely protected against creditors while
allowing the settlor to maintain control and enjoyment of the
assets. The Alaska and Delaware legislation attempts to change
the existing law by allowing a settlor to create a trust which
names the settlor as a beneficiary and includes a provision that
protects the assets from the settlor's creditors, that will be
15
enforced under their laws.

13.

See discussion infra Part III.B.

14.
See Elena Marty-Nelson, Taxing Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Icing
on the Cake?, 15 VA. TAX REV. 399, 412 (1996) [hereinafter Marty-Nelson, Taxing

Offshore]; Elizabeth R. Turner & Kathryn G. Henkel, Asset Protection Techniques,
in C992 ADVANCED ESTATE PLANNING TECHNIQUES 1, 42 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of

Study 1995); Philip R. Rupprecht &Jonathan P. Friedland, Falloutfrom Portnoy: Is
There Bankruptcy Protection in an Asset Protection Trust?, BANKR. STRATEGIST, July
1997, at 1, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
15.
See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Lexis 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.12
§§ 3570-76 (Supp. 1998). A trust is defined as "a fiduciary relationship with
respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to the property is held
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A. The Goal of Asset Protectionand the Tools Used to Achieve It
Individuals generally seek to accomplish one or more of the
following goals when ordering their finances so as to provide for
themselves and their families during life as well as upon death:
estate planning, financial planning, and asset protection.' 6 The
main goal of estate planning is to ensure that upon a client's
death his property passes smoothly and in accordance with his
intentions to the people or entities that he wants to receive
portions of his estate. 17 In addition, estate planning seeks to
protect the estate from probate, a costly and time-consuming
process, and to minimize tax liability.' 8 Financial planning seeks
to achieve a balance between risk and reward in order to
maximize an estate's growth. 19 Asset protection planning aims to
organize one's assets in such a way so as to safeguard them from

loss that could otherwise result from their exposure to potential
20

creditors.
Asset protection planning generally seeks to preserve and
21
protect one's estate during one's lifetime as well as after death.
Interest in asset protection planning has increased as a result of
the financial uncertainties facing a businessperson, a
professional, an entrepreneur, or a property owner in the United
States today.2 2 Various economic and social factors have caused
many financially successful people to feel their wealth is at risk,
which has led them to utilize asset protection strategies to
24
safeguard their wealth.2 3 Expanding theories of legal liability,

to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another person."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRusTs § 2 (1959).
16.
See Barry S. Engel, Using Foreign Situs Trusts for Asset Protection
Planning, 20 EST. PLAN. 212, 212 (1993). For the purposes of this Note, the
analysis is limited to trusts established by "U.S. persons" as that term is defined
in I.R.C. section 7701(a)(30). That provision defines the term "U.S. person" as "(A)
a citizen or resident of the United States, (B) a domestic partnership, (C) a
domestic corporation, [and] (D) any estate or trust (other than a foreign estate or
foreign trust within the meaning of [§ 7701(a)](31))." I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30) (Supp. II
1996). This Note does not address issues relating to a non-resident alien of the
United States establishing a foreign trust for the benefit of U.S. beneficiaries.
17.
See Engel, supranote 16, at 212.
18.
See id.
19.
See id.
See id. The term asset protection can be defined very broadly to include
20.
any type of financial planning that has the effect of reducing taxes or preserving
assets. See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 11, at 209. However, the term is more often
used when protecting one's assets is a motive for a transaction, as opposed to just an
incidental effect. See ic.
21.
See Engel, supranote 16, at 212.
22.,
See id. at 212-13.

23,

See id.
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result-oriented judges, juries willing to disregard precedent,
unpredictably high damage awards, and the unavailability of
adequate insurance coverage are some of the factors that have
lead to an increased demand for asset protection planning.25
Asset protection devices serve not only to protect a wealthy
client's assets against an unfavorable judgment, but also to
26
red-ace the risk that a client will be sued in the first place.
Successful professionals
and any other high-net-worth
individuals that appear to have deep pockets are often last
resorts for plaintiffs looking to compensate a loss.2 7 Some believe
that wealth alone can be an incentive for claimants to file suits.
Therefore, protecting one's assets can dissuade claims from being
made and also provide incentive for settlements more favorable to
28
a wealthy defendant.
There are many different methods that can be used to protect
assets. 2 9 These methods offer varying degrees of protection from
creditors. The amount of protection provided depends upon the
device chosen, how it is structured, applicable state law, and the

particular client's situation and goals.3 0

Some of the various

asset protection planning tools include limited partnerships and
family limited partnerships, 3 ' custodial accounts, joint ownership

of assets between spouses,3 2 domestic trusts, offshore trusts,
outright gifts, incorporating assets, and investment in tax exempt
assets.3
However, steps to protect assets must be taken,
regardless of what device is employed, prior to the existence of

24.
Such liability may include tort liability stemming from professional
practice, or liability to creditors arising from loans or other financial transactions
necessary for financing personal or business affairs. See William D. Lipkind &
Elizabeth Gasser, Protecting Assets from Creditors; High Net Worth: The
Accoutrements of Success, CPA JOURNAL, Sept. 1993, at 18, 18.
25.
See Jon Newberry, Protect Assets Before Lawsuit Arises: Financial
PlanningCan Help PreserveProfits, Dissuade Claimants,82 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at
89, 89.
26.
See id.
27.
See Lipkind & Gasser, supranote 24, at 18.
28.
See id.
29.
See generally Engel, supranote 16, at 213-14.
30.
See generally Brad Burg, Moves to Make, Before You're Sued; 1996
FinancialPlanningGuide, MEDICAL ECON., Nov. 13, 1995, at 57.
31.
See Engel, supra note 16, at 213-14 (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of using limited partnerships as a means of protecting assets). See
also Turner & Henkel, supranote 14, at 44-78 (providing an in-depth analysis of
the use of family limited partnerships as an asset protection method).
32.
See Burg, supranote 30, at 62-69, for a discussion regarding the pros
and cons of these asset protection methods.
33.
See generally Turner & Henkel, supra note 14, at 28-80 (for a detailed
discussion of these asset protection tools).
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any known or expected creditor or claimant.3 4 Otherwise, the
transfer may be deemed fraudulent and void with respect to
35

creditors.

B. The Optimum Asset Protector-TheSelf-Settled
Spendthrift Trust
Transferring assets into a trust can have the primary or

incidental effect of removing them from the reach of the settlor's
creditors, thus protecting the assets.3 6 Ensuring the financial
security of the trust beneficiaries for the duration of the trust is a

fundamental purpose of virtually all trusts.3 7

There are many

different types of trusts that offer varying degrees of asset

protection.3 8 However, there are certain protective mechanisms
that are frequently incorporated into trust instruments in an
effort to defeat creditor access to trust holdings. 3 9 A trust may
contain a spendthrift or a forfeiture clause. Such clauses restrict
a beneficiary's access to trust assets, which has the effect of also

restricting the beneficiary's creditors from the trust funds. 4 0 In
addition,

the

beneficiary's

interest

in

the

trust

may

be

conditioned upon a certain standard, as in a support trust, or be
subject to the trustee's discretion, thereby creating a
41
discretionary trust.

1. What is a "Self-Settled Spendthrift Trust"?
Trusts intended to remove assets from the reach of the
settlor's creditors are often referred to as "asset-protection
trusts. "4 2 The prevailing opinion among estate planners and
asset protection experts is that self-settled spendthrift trusts offer

34.
See William D. Zabel & Kim E. Baptiste, Asset Protection and Estate
Planning:Three Scenarios,TR. & EST., Nov. 1995, at 54, 56-57.
35.
See id.
36.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 11, at 185. There are also other asset
protection methods available, such as family gift giving, taldng advantage of
various creditor exemptions available under states' laws, and family limited
partnerships. See Engel, supranote 16, at 213.
37.
See Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset ProtectionTrusts: Having Your
Cake and Eating It Too, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 17 (1994) [hereinafter MartyNelson, Asset Protection Trusts]. The analysis in this Note does not encompass
offshore trusts used to evade income taxes illegally.
38.
Trusts serve many purposes other than asset protection including
estate planning, reducing taxes, and avoiding probate. See id. at 17 n.31.
39.
See id. at 17.
40.
See id.
41.
See id.
42.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supranote 11, at 185.
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the settlor the greatest amount of asset protection. 4 3 To create
this ideal trust a settlor transfers his assets into trust, names
himself as a beneficiary, includes a provision that the trust
holdings may not be voluntarily or involuntarily alienated prior to
distribution, and appoints as trustee either himself or a third
party over whom he retains certain powers. 4 4 Such a trust
construction has the effect of shielding the trust funds from the
settlor's creditors while still allowing the settlor to receive income
as a beneficiary and exercise some control over the management
of the trust.
A spendthrift trust in its truest form requires mandatory
distributions and provides in the trust instrument that the
beneficiaries can neither voluntarily nor involuntarily alienate
their interests and that their creditors cannot reach the trust's
assets. 4 5 Simply placing a provision in the instrument that
restrains the beneficiaries and their creditors from enjoying rights
to the trust's assets creates such a trust.4 6
Initially, settlors desiring to insulate trust assets for the
benefit of a financially irresponsible beneficiary used spendthrift
trusts.47

However, spendthrift trusts were soon commonly used

43.
See id. at 211. See also Marty-Nelson, Taxing Offshore, supra note 14,
at 415 n.85 (noting that offshore jurisdictions are usually chosen "to obtain
maximum protection against potential future creditors").
44.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 11, at 211. Retained powers over the

trustee could include the power to appoint and terminate trustees or the power to
veto distributions. See id.
-45.
JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, & ESTATES
631 (5th ed. 1995). A spendthrift trust is one "in which the interest of a
beneficiary cannot be assigned by him or reached by his creditors." 2A AUSTIN W.
ScOTT WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OFTRusTS, § 151, at 83 (4th ed. 1987).
46.
See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supranote 45, at 631. An example of a
spendthrift provision would be:
Each beneficiary hereunder is hereby restrained from alienating,
anticipating, encumbering, or in any manner assigning his or her interest
or estate, either in principal or income, and is without power so to do, nor
shall such interest or estate be subject to his or her liabilities or
obligations nor to judgment or other legal process, bankruptcy proceedings
or claims of creditors or others.
Shelly v. Shelly, 354 P.2d 282, 284 (Or. 1960).
47.
See Marty-Nelson, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 37, at 19.
Spendthrift trusts gained legal recognition as a result of dicta in Nichols v. Eaton
that stated:
Why a parent, or one who loves another, and wishes to use his own
property in securing the object of his affection, as far as property can do it,
from the ills of life, the vicissitudes of fortune, and even his own
improvidence, or incapacity for self-protection, should not be permitted to
do so, is not readily perceived.
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to protect responsible beneficiaries from their potential
creditors. 48 The spendthrift trust, when set up for the benefit of
someone other than the settlor, is recognized and enforced in
almost all jurisdictions either under common law doctrine or by
statute. 49
Spendthrift trusts are enforced against creditors of a
beneficiary other than the settlor on the theory that as absolute
owner of property a settlor may dispose of that property as he
wishes.5 0 Once a settlor places assets in a spendthrift trust, the
trustee is the legal owner of the property and the beneficiaries
own an equitable interest in the trust until such time as assets
are distributed. 5 ' Courts reason that enforcing spendthrift trusts
does not thwart public policy unless the effect is fraud upon
creditors. 5 2 They further justify the enforcement of spendthrift
provisions by concluding that creditors can avoid being
defrauded, because they are able to determine if a trust
beneficiary's interest is limited by a spendthrift clause prior to
entering into a transaction.5 3 Once the creditor learns that the
beneficiary's interest in trust is restricted by a spendthrift
provision he can either bargain for increased protection or simply
54
choose not to deal with the beneficiary.
Of course, this reasoning does not apply to all types of
creditors. In fact, this reasoning assumes that all creditors enter
into transactions with trust beneficiaries voluntarily, and ignores
the existence of involuntary creditors, who are also called "special
claimants."5 s Such claimants include children, spouses, or tort

victims to whom the settlor may owe legitimate debts; none of
these claimants had the opportunity to choose their role as a

Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 727 (1875). Then in Broadway National Bank v.
Adams, the court upheld the validity of the spendthrift trust. 133 Mass. 170
(1882). This is considered the seminal case in establishing spendthrift trusts.
See Marty-Nelson, Asset Protection Trusts, supranote 37, at 11 n.2.
48.
See Marty-Nelson, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 37, at 19. See
Nancy S. Roush & Robert K. Kirkland, Spendthrift Trusts Not Limited to Protection
of Immature Dependents, 18 EST. PLAN. 16, 17 (1991) (suggesting spendthrift trusts
are routinely used to protect responsible beneficiaries).
49.
See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 45, at 632. By statute New
York recognizes all trusts as spendthrift unless the beneficiary's interest is
expressly transferable. See N.Y. EST., POWERS & TR. LAW § 7-1.5 (McKinney 1992).
50.
See Marty-Nelson, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 37, at 20;
Broadway Natl Bank, 133 Mass. at 173.
51.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supranote 11, at 211.
52.
See Marty-Nelson, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 37, at 20;
BroadwayNat'l Bank, 133 Mass. at 173.
53.
See Marty-Nelson, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 37, at 20.
BroadwayNat'l Bank, 133 Mass. at 173.
54.
See Marty-Nelson, Asset Protection Trusts, supranote 37, at 20.
55.
See id. at 20-21 & n.50.
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creditor of the settlor.5 6 This class of claimants receives special
treatment under some states' laws with respect to access to
57
spendthrift trusts.
If a court enforces a trust's spendthrift clause, then the
beneficiary's interest in the trust is not available to satisfy the
claims of the beneficiary's creditors. s 8 Thus, a creditor cannot
gain access to the trust assets by attachment, garnishment, or
other legal process.5 9 However, once money from the trust is
distributed to the beneficiary, the funds are no longer protected
60
and are subject to creditors' claims.
2. The Controversial Nature of Spendthrift Trusts
The inclusion of spendthrift clauses in trusts has been a
controversial issue since these clauses were first recognized and
enforced by the courts. 6 1 Compelling arguments have been made
both for and against their validity. Some question the
appropriateness of protecting trust beneficiaries from their
financial obligations. 62 Why should a debtor not be made to pay
his legitimate debts just because of a trust provision?
Spendthrift provisions may have a detrimental effect upon society
in that they allow the financially irresponsible to continue to be
irresponsible and wasteful, and they are misleading as they have
the potential to defraud unsuspecting creditors. 63 In addition,
spendthrift trusts give beneficiaries a disincentive to carry
insurance, exercise care in dealings with creditors, and take
precautions to avoid a tort judgment.6
Conversely, those in support of spendthrift clauses argue
that the settlor of a trust for the benefit of another should be able

56.
See generally id. at 43-46.
57.
See id. at 40 n. 138, 46.
58.
See id. at 22.
59.
See id. See also PETER A. ALCES, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS,
1.01[2][a] (1989) (discussing the legal remedies generally available to creditors).
60.
See Marty-Nelson, Asset ProtectionTrusts, supranote 37, at 22.
61.
See generally Anne S. Emanuel, Spendthrift Trusts: Its Time to Codify
the Compromise, 72 NEB. L. REv. 179 (1993) (explaining both sides of the debate
over the appropriateness of including spendthrift provisions in trusts); Broadway
Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882) (validating the spendthrift trust).
62.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supranote 11, at 211.
63.
See GEORGE T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRuSTS, 149 (5th ed.

1973). Two other arguments against spendthrift trusts include: (1) equitable life
or fee interests are inherently alienable so a clause prohibiting the transfer of
equitable interests is against their nature, and (2) legal estates for life or in fee
cannot be encumbered by restrictions on alienability and there is no reason that
is should not be the same for equitable interests. These arguments have more to
do with policy regarding property. See id.
64.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supranote 11, at 213.
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to attach to it such restrictions. 6 S Moreover, they argue that
spendthrift trusts are valuable in providing for and protecting
unknowledgeable and incompetent beneficiaries. 6 6 Furthermore,
proponents of these trusts maintain that the trusts do not have
the effect of defrauding creditors because creditors can inquire
into a beneficiary's source of income, get a credit report, or
condition the giving of credit upon a statement of assets.6 7
The controversy regarding spendthrift trusts increases when
the settlor of such a trust names himself as a beneficiary, thereby
creating a self-settled spendthrift trust. This type of trust is
considered the ultimate in asset protection devices because it
allows the settlor to retain an interest in and even control over
the trust, receive distributions as a beneficiary, and yet shield the
assets from the claims of his creditors. 6 8 Advocates of self-settled
spendthrift trusts argue that they are necessary tools to combat
the explosion of litigation and legal liability that has occurred in
this country. 6 9 They argue that those with wealth are more likely
to be the targets of unscrupulous lawsuits and that asset

protection devices, such as the spendthrift trust, are necessary to
protect their assets for themselves and their families. 70 In a
climate where deep pockets are thought to attract lawsuits,
spendthrift trusts offer a form of counter-leverage against
unwarranted litigation. 7 1 This deterrent effect reduces not only
the threat of groundless suits, but also saves the costs of
defending against such litigation and the extorted settlements
that often result. 72
However, there are compelling arguments against the
propriety of self-settled spendthrift trusts. Most of the arguments
in favor of these instruments ignore the effects of such trusts on
involuntary creditors. 7 3 While it is true that commercial lender
creditors generally have the chance to investigate and bargain up
front with the debtor, involuntary creditors have no such

65.
See BOGERT, supranote 63, at 149.
66.
See id.
67.
See id. Additional arguments in favor of spendthrift trusts are that a
restriction on the alienability of trust property is not undesirable since the trustee
can usually sell it free of the trusts even though the beneficiary cannot transfer
his interest. See id. Bogert makes the point that creditors also have the option of
collecting from the beneficiary over time by taking the income after it has been
distributed. See id.
68.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supranote 11, at 207-08.
69.
See Gideon Rothschild, Establishing and Drafting Offshore Asset
Protection Trusts, 23 EST. PLAN. 65, 65 (1996); Engel, supra note 16, at 212.
70.
See Rothschild, supranote 69, at 65-66.
71.
See id. at 65.
72.
See id.
73.
See generally Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy:
Economic and Cognitive Perspectives,73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 77 (1995).
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opportunity.7 4 Tort victims, and spouses and children of settlors
do not have the benefit of selecting, investigating, or bargaining
with the settlor before becoming creditors.75 In particular, tort
victims and children of the settlor are not able to avoid contact
76
with the beneficiary.
Just as one can avoid legitimate debt by careful dealings when
borrowing money or contracting for services, one can also avoid
tort judgments by exercising appropriate care.
Also, those
professionals who are subject to malpractice claims can purchase
insurance to protect against lawsuits.7 7 Such protective measures
would reduce the need for use of the self-settled spendthrift trust.
Alternatively, a potentially negative societal effect of the use of selfsettled spendthrift trusts is that it gives the settlor little incentive to
exercise an appropriate standard of care in his dealings with others
or to purchase insurance.7 8 In addition, the assertion that asset
protection trusts are necessary to combat the threat of illegitimate
claims undermines the entire U.S. justice system. 7 9 This argument
assumes a wealthy defendant will not be treated fairly in the
system merely because he is wealthy. 80
C. The United States v. ForeignJurisdictions:Differing Legal
Approaches to Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts
Up until the passage of the Alaska and Delaware statutes, it
was the rule in most states that a settlor's creditors could reach
assets in self-settled trusts, regardless of whether the trust
instrument contained a spendthrift provision. 8 1 This treatment of
domestic self-settled spendthrift trusts under traditional state law
reflects what has been the prevailing policy in the United Statesit is unjust to allow an individual to simultaneously shield assets

74.
See id.
75.
See id. Arguably, alimony creditors are in fact voluntary since they
presumably entered into marriage willingly. See WILLIAM M. McGOVERN, JR. ET AL.,
WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 8.7, at 345-46 (1988). For a discussion of the
weakness of the contract analogy to the marriage relationship, see Ira M. Eliman,
The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. RaV. 1, 13-33 (1989).
76.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supranote 11, at 213. See also Laurene M. Brooks,
Comment, A Tort-CreditorException to the Spendthrift Trust Doctrine:A Call to the
Wisconsin Legislature, 73 MARQ. L. REv. 109, 126 (1989) (making the point that
one who is about to get hit by an automobile "has no opportunity to investigate
the credit of the driver of the automobile and has no opportunity to avoid being
injured no matter what the resources of the driver may be").
77.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 11, at 213.
78.
See id.
79.
See id.
80.
See id. (noting that a wealthy defendant can countersue for malicious
prosecution).
81.
See infra discussion Part III.C. 1.
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and enjoy benefit or control over them. 8 2 Because of this policy,
states uniformly outlawed self-settled spendthrift trusts either by
statute or judicially developed common law.8 3 As a result,

offshore trusts were used as asset protection vehicles since
certain foreign jurisdictions allow a settlor to be a trust
beneficiary while protecting the trust against the claims of the
settlor's creditors.
1. The U.S. Approach: Outlawing the Self-Settled Spendthrift
Trust
United States-courts will generally enforce spendthrift trusts
that are created by the settlor for the benefit of a third party.
However, there are several exceptions to this practice.8 4 In most
cases, judgments for child support or alimony can be enforced
against the debtor's interest in a spendthrift trust.8 5 In addition,
one who provides necessary services or support for the
6
beneficiary of a spendthrift trust can usually reach trust assets.8
Under these circumstances, courts and legislatures have
recognized that it would be unfair and unjust to protect a
beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust to the detriment of
certain kinds of creditors.
Significant legal obstacles exist in the United States to limit
the ability of settlors to use trusts to shield their assets from
creditors.8 7 Namely, common law rules or statutes exist in
almost every state, which permit a settlor's creditors to satisfy
their claims by accessing trust assets where the settlor is also a
beneficiary.8 8 Such rules and statutes essentially refuse to

82.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959); see also MartyNelson, Asset Protection Trusts, supranote 37, at 14.
83.
See Marty-Nelson, Asset Protection Trusts, supranote 37, at 30 n.95 for
a list of states with statutes specifically addressing spendthrift provisions in selfsettled trusts.
States without statutes specifically addressing self-settled
spendthrift trusts often achieve the same results through judicially produced
common law. See id. at 31.
84.
See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supranote 45, at 638.
85.
See, e.g., Shelley v. Shelley, 354 P.2d 282, 286-88 (Or. 1960) (holding
that a beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust may be reached for alimony and
child support claims based on a strong public policy rationale).
86.
See 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 45, §'157.2, at 201.
87.
See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 45, at 638; Gebbia-Pinetti,
supranote 11, at 185.
88.
See 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 45, § 156, at 168-69. Many
states have codified the rule presented in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
regarding self-settled spendthrift trusts. See Gideon Rothschild, Asset Protection
Issues that Arise in Estate Planning, in BAsic ESTATE PLANNING 243, 262 (PLI Est.
Plan. & Admin. Course Handbook Series No. D-254 1997). New York, for example,
enacted a statute stating that a disposition in trust for the use of the settlor is
void as against existing or subsequent creditors of the settlor. See N.Y. EST.
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enforce the settlor's attempt to shield his assets by ignoring the
trust's spendthrift provision as applied to the settlor.8 9
Furthermore, fraudulent transfer laws, which exist in some
form in every state, prohibit a debtor from transferring his assets
with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. 90 In some
states a transfer by a debtor may be deemed fraudulent if it has
the effect of reducing his available assets to the detriment of his
creditors, even if he has no actual intent to defraud. 9 ' Any type

of transfer may be found to be fraudulent, if it meets this intent
or effect criteria, whether it is an outright gift to a family member
or a transfer into trust.9 2 However, a transfer into a trust in
which the debtor-settlor retains any right to assets that he claims
are not available to creditors is more likely to be suspect as a
fraudulent conveyance. 93 Where a transfer is found to be
fraudulent a court will deem the transfer void, and the creditor
94
may recoup the amount he is owed.
Courts in almost all states except Alaska and Delaware
refuse to enforce a spendthrift trust against a settlor's creditors
where the trust is set up by the settlor for the settlor's own
benefit-in other words, a self-settled spendthrift trust.95 In a
mandatory distribution self-settled trust, the creditors of the
settlor can reach all of the settlor's interest in the trust.9 6 In a
discretionary self-settled trust, creditors can reach the maximum
amount that the trustee, in his discretion, could pay the settlor
as beneficiary. 97 When a settlor names himself as a trust
beneficiary, under state law the settlor's creditors can reach the
trust assets.9 8 Most states have adopted the rule of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts which explains that "[w]here a
person creates for his own benefit a trust for support or a

POWERS & TR. LAW § 7-3.1 (McKinney 1992). Setting aside such a transfer does
not require proof of either intent to defraud or insolvency. See Vanderbilt Credit
Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 473 N.Y.S.2d 242, 245 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).

89.

See infra note 106 and accompanying text.

90.
Some states have adopted uniform statutory provisions, or similar
variations, such as the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA) and Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA7), while others deal with fraudulent conveyances

as a matter of common law. See ALCEs, supranote 59, 1.021][b].
91.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 11, at 185.
92.
Courts may be suspicious of gratuitous interfamilial transfers and have
even taken the position that they are presumptively fraudulent. See ALCES, supra
note 59, 1.02[i][b].
93.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supranote 11, at 185.
94.
See ALcEs, supra note 59, 1.01[2].
95.
See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supranote 45, at 638.
96.
See id.
97.
Id. See 2A ScoTr & FRATCHER, supranote 45, § 156.2, at 175.

98.
See Marty-Nelson, Taxing Offshore, supranote 14, at 430. See, e.g., In
re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).

846

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 32:831

discretionary trust, his transferee or creditors can reach the
maximum amount which the trustee under the terms of the trust
could pay to him or apply for his benefit." 9 9 This rule furthers
the principle that it is unfair to allow a person to arrange his
property in such a way that he can enjoy it while preventing his
creditors from reaching it.100
The question of whether a creditor can access a settlor's
assets held in a self-settled spendthrift trust may arise in the U.S.
legal system in various ways. In a "genuine" creditor case a
creditor is a party in the lawsuit seeking access to trust assets in
order to satisfy a debt.1 0 1 Alternatively, the issue could be
addressed in tax cases in which there is no actual creditor

seeking satisfaction of a claim, but the issue of creditor access
determines the estate and gift tax consequences of the trust to
10 2
the settlor.
Many states have adopted the Restatement rule regarding
creditor access, thereby reinforcing the rule that creditors can
reach self-settled spendthrift trusts.1 0 3 New York courts, allowing
creditor access to self-settled discretionary trusts, specifically adopt
the Restatement's position and allow invasion of the trust corpus
even in situations in which the settlor is not the only trust
beneficiary.1 0 4 Similarly, under Texas law it is clear that creditors
have access to self-settled trusts. 0 5 By statute Texas law
expressly states that "a provision restraining the voluntary or
involuntary transfer" of the interest of a settlor who is also a
beneficiary, "does not prevent his creditors from satisfying claims
from his interest in the trust."10 6 In applying this statute, one
Texas court noted the underlying policy that self-settled spendthrift
or discretionary trusts are invalid.10 7 Likewise, courts have held
that under Hawaii law a settlor's creditors may reach the entire

99.
100.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 156(2) (1959).
See 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 45, § 156, at 167.

101.

See Marty-Nelson, Taxing Offshore, supranote 14, at 431.

102.
103.

See id.
See id

104. See id. See, e.g., State v. Coyle, 575 N.Y.S.2d 975, 976-77 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1991); State v. Hawes, 564 N.Y.S.2d 637, 638-39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991);
Vanderbilt Credit Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 473 N.Y.S.2d 242, 245 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984).
105. Texas has adopted the RESTATEMENT rule. See Marty-Nelson, Taxing
Offshore, supra note 14, at 432. See In re Shurley, 171 B.R. at 769, 769 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1994).
106. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035(d) (West 1995).
107. See Marty-Nelson, Taxing Offshore, supra note 14, at 432-33; see also
In re Shurley, 171 B.R. at 78 1.
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trust corpus, if the trustee has absolute discretion to pay income to
either the settlor or to other beneficiaries. 1 0 8
Tax cases interpreting creditor access laws also follow the
Restatement's position. 10 9 Most recent tax decisions have held
that when a settlor includes himself among the class of
beneficiaries in a discretionary trust, the settlor's creditors can
reach trust assets regardless of any spendthrift provision." 0
These opinions are based on analysis of the local law that applies
to the case.'
The prevailing opinion among estate planners and asset
protection experts has consistently been that the self-settled
spendthrift trust offers a settlor the greatest amount of asset
protection available." 2 However, up until the recently enacted
Alaska and Delaware legislation, this type of trust has been
113
deemed to be against public policy in the United States.
Therefore, U.S. courts have refused to enforce the creditor
protection provisions expressly stated in self-settled trusts and
have allowed creditor access to assets held in self-settled
spendthrift trusts." 4 As a result, U.S. citizens seeking asset
protection through the use of self-settled spendthrift
trusts have
5
been forced to go to offshore jurisdictions."
2. Foreign Jurisdictions: Not Only Are Self-Settled Spendthrift
Trusts Legal, They Are Encouraged
Offshore asset protection trusts are created under the laws of
foreign jurisdictions typically with the purpose of shielding assets
from current or future creditors. 11 6 Various foreign jurisdictions

have enacted legislation that favors the creation of such trusts by
making it very difficult for creditors to gain access to the trust's

108. See Marty-Nelson, Taxing Offshore, supra note 14, at 433; see also
Altman v. Commissioner, 83 B.R. 35 (D. Haw. 1988).
109. See Marty-Nelson, Taxing Offshore, supranote 14, at 434-35.
110. Seeid.at435.
111. See id.
112.
See id. at 415 n.85 (noting that offshore jurisdictions are usually
chosen "to obtain maximum protection against potential future creditors"). See
also Gebbia-Pinetti, supranote 11, at 211.
113.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRusTs § 156 (1959).

114. See supranotes 104-110 and accompanying text.
115. See Marty-Nelson, Asset Protection Trusts, supranote 37, at 62 (stating
that the use of offshore asset protection trusts are a solution to the U.S. rule of
law regarding self-settled spendthrift trusts).
116.
See id. at 12. Such trusts may be referred to as "OAPTs" (Offshore
Asset Protection Trusts), "FAPTs" (Foreign Asset Protection Trusts), "IOEPTs"
(International Offshore Estate Planning Trusts), and "global protection trusts." See
Hompesch et al., supra note 6, at 9; Marty-Nelson, Asset ProtectionTrusts, supra
note 37, at 12.
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assets. 117 Such foreign legislation can provide virtually
impenetrable barriers against creditors seeking access to trust
18
assets.'
Although offshore trusts may take a variety of forms, those
geared toward asset protection, tend to have certain common
characteristics.1 1 9 Once formed, the trust is irrevocable. 120 The
beneficiaries of the trust are generally the settlor's family
members, particularly the spouse and children, and will also
include the settlor himself.12 1 The trustee is typically a foreign
trust company or financial institution. 12 2 Possibilities for the
duration of the trust include: a relatively short period of time with
a reversionary interest in the settlor, a longer term tied to the
lives of the settlor or beneficiaries, or the maximum number of
years allowed by the offshore jurisdiction. 12 3 The trust
instrument usiually vests the trustee with unfettered discretion
over the distribution of income and principal among the
beneficiaries. 12 4 However, the settlor often reserves some
125
measure of control over the trust's management.
This typical offshore trust structure was thought to be
desirable because it offered greater protection against creditors
than any U.S. trust and it achieved this protection without the
12 6
settlor having to give up total control over the trust's assets.
There are also tax consequences that follow from this protection

against creditors. 127 A settlor's gross estate, for the purposes of
117, See Engel, supranote 16, at 215-16. Foreign jurisdictions commonly
chosen include the Bahamas, Belize, Cyprus, the Turks and Caicos Islands, the
Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands, Isle of Man, and Gibraltar. See id.
118.
See Marty-Nelson, Taxing Offshore, supranote 14, at 402.
119.
See id. at 404.
120.
See Lynn R. Saidenberg, Estate Planning and Creditors' Rights, in
UNDERSTANDING BASIC ESTATE PLANNING 81, 100 (PLI Tax Law & Est. Plan. Course

Handbook Series No. 223, 1993).
121.
See id.
122.
See Bruce et al., supranote 1, at 1.
123.
See Marty-Nelson, Taxing Offshore, supranote 14, at 405.
124. See Saidenberg, supranote 120, at 100.
125.
See Marty-Nelson, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 37, at 13. The
settlor may be a member of a "committee of advisors" that advises the trustee on
the management of the trust. See Richard S. Amari, Asset Protection Trusts:
Nuclear Bomb Shelter, FLA. B. J., July-Aug. 1992, at 17-19. However, the trustee
should be able to ignore the advice of the committee, so that the committee does
not have legal control over the trust administration. See id. The settlor could
instead self-designate himself as "protector" of the trust with authority to replace
the trustee. See Saidenberg, supra note 120, at 100. Often the settlor provides
the foreign trustee with a "letter of wishes" that is non-binding and describes the
settlor's preferences regarding the trust's distribution. See Samuel H. Okoshken,
Artful Structuring of an Offshore Trust, INT'L HERALD TRIB.(Neuilly-sur-Seine, Fr.),
May 29, 1993, at 248, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
126. See Marty-Nelson, Asset Protection Trusts, supranote 37, at 13.
127. See Marty-Nelson, Taxing Offshore, supranote 14, at 402.
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computing tax liability, excludes trust assets if these assets are
successfully shielded from creditor access. 128 The transferor's
gross estate includes assets transferred into the trust, if creditors
can gain access to them. 129 This exclusion often cannot be
achieved with certainty in domestic trusts due to their vulnerable
position in relation to creditors.1 3 0 As a result of these
differences, it is argued that offshore trusts also offer tax
advantages not attainable in U.S. trusts, thereby increasing the
allure of foreign jurisdictions.13 1
Despite this potential tax benefit, asset protection is the
primary reason people look to foreign jurisdictions to establish
trusts.' 3 2 The use of offshore trusts has increased among
Americans in recent years. 13 3
Formerly, only the extremely
wealthy utilized the offshore trust as an asset protection or
estate-planning device. 134
However, the use of offshore trusts
has increased with the demand for effective means of asset
protection resulting from the perceived proliferation of personal
liability in this country.' 3 s Offshore trusts have become popular
among professionals who consider themselves to be vulnerable to
malpractice claims, such as doctors, lawyers, or accountants,
and company officers or directors who could potentially face
environmental tort liability.' 3 6 These businesspeople and
professionals seek to shield their assets from the potentially
devastating effects of litigation through the use of offshore
trusts.' 3 7

Offshore trusts, created in jurisdictions with favorable asset
protection laws, offer unique security to those who seek to ensure
that their assets are out of the reach of current or future
creditors. Prior to the passage of the Alaska and Delaware
legislation, the consensus among experts in the field of trusts and
estates was that an offshore asset protection trust offered the
38
maximum amount of creditor protection.1

128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See U However, greater protection against creditors is the more
common reason for establishing a trust in an offshore jurisdiction.
See
Saidenberg, supranote 120, at 99.
132. See Saidenburg, supranote 120, at 99.
133. See Marty-Nelson, Asset ProtectionTrusts, supranote 37, at 14.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 56-57.
136. See id. at 14. See also Smart Move, TIMES (London), Nov. 12, 1991, at
29 (identifying professionals who are at high risk of malpractice suits).
137. See Marty-Nelson, Asset ProtectionTrusts, supranote 37, at 14.
138. See Engel, supra note 16, at 215-15. Barry S. Engel is an attorney and
specialist in asset protection planning. See id. at 212. He is also President of the
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Another reason offshore trusts are so popular is that they
allow settlors to retain a certain level of control over the property
transferred into trust, which has not been possible under
traditional domestic trust law.1 3 9 It is often the case that those
who are concerned with asset protection do not like the idea of
surrendering control of their assets to a trustee. 14 ° However,
relinquishing control has been a necessary element in forming a
domestic trust that will serve to protect assets. If the settlor
maintains control over a domestic trust, then under the laws of
most states the trust is subject to creditors' claims against the
settlor. Creditors against the settlor can reach trust assets to the
extent that the settlor is entitled or eligible to receive them. Thus,
there are substantial trade-offs to be considered when deciding
between an offshore and domestic trust vehicle.
Offshore trusts often defeat principles that are entrenched in
U.S. trust law. 14 1 Namely, the principle that one should not be
able to control and benefit from property that is shielded from
one's creditors, a principle upheld in most states through
statutory or common law. 142 The use of offshore trusts bypasses
these state laws that prohibit self-settled spendthrift trusts and
allow settlors to reap the asset protection benefits of self-settled
spendthrift trusts.

Ill. ALASKA AND DELAWARE TRY TO COMPETE WITH
FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS

Alaska and Delaware recently enacted legislation that
purports to make it possible for residents of any state to create
self-settled spendthrift trusts. 14 3 They claim to allow settlors to

Offshore Institute and has helped write trust legislation for a foreign jurisdiction.
See id.
139.
See icl.at 214.
140. See id.
141. See Marty-Nelson, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 37, at 13. See
generally, Baker, supranote 2, at 55.
142. See Marty-Nelson, Asset Protection Trusts, supranote 37, at 13. For a
list of states with statutes that specifically prohibit spendthrift provisions to selfsettled trusts, see id. at 30 n.95. States without statutes specifically addressing
self-settled spendthrift trusts often achieve the same result through judiciallyproduced common law. See id. at 31; 2A ScOrr & FRATCHER, supra note 45, § 156,
at 165 n.1.
143. Governor Knowles of Alaska signed The Alaska Trust Act into law on
April 1, 1997, and shortly thereafter, on July 9, 1997, Governor Carter of
Delaware signed amendments to Delaware's trust laws. See Douglas J. Blattmachr
and Richard W. Hompesch II, Alaska vs. Delaware: Heavyweight Competition in
New Trust Laws, PROB. & PRoP., Jan./Feb. 1998, at 32, 32.
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create trusts under this new legislation that will be protected
14
should creditors' claims arise.

A. The New Laws: What Do They Say?
The Alaska Trust Act and Delaware's Qualified Disposition in
Trust Act amend their codes to allow settlors to make lifetime
transfers into trust from which they are eligible, but not entitled,
to receive distributions according to the discretion of a third-party
trustee. 1 45 Alaska was the first to enact laws allowing self-settled
spendthrift trusts, and Delaware followed just three months
later. 1 ' Most of the essential provisions of the new trust laws
are the same, but there are a few significant differences to be
noted.1 47 The Delaware Act was closely modeled after Alaska's

legislation and in fact expressly stated its intention "to maintain
Delaware's role as the most favored domestic jurisdiction for the
14 8
establishment of trusts."
As some other states have recently done,1 4 9 the Alaska Act

abolishes the common law rule against perpetuities with respect
to Alaskan trusts. 5 0

This allows a settlor to create a perpetual

144.
See Douglas Blattmachr, Alaska Trusts Offer Unequaled Asset
Protection, PRIVATE AssET MGMT., Feb. 23, 1998, at 8, available in LEXIS, NEWS
Library, CURNWS File.
145.
See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Lexis 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§
3570-76 (Supp. 1998); see also Blattmachr et al., supranote 6, at 347. According
to authors of the Act these lifetime transfers are considered complete for federal
gift and estate tax purposes. See Blattmachr et al., supra note 6, at 347. It is
possible that the settlor could serve as a trustee who makes or participates in
investment decisions with respect to trust assets without exposing those assets to
the claims of creditors under Alaska law. See id. at 356 n.43. However, if the
settlor is a trustee who makes or participates in decisions about whether to make
payments to the beneficiaries, of which he is one of, under Alaska law that would
expose the trust assets to the claims of his creditors. See id.
146.
See supranote 143.
147.
See Blattmachr & Hompesch, supranote 143, at 34.
148.
Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act, Synopsis, Pub. Act 159, 71 Del.
Laws 159 (1997), available in LEXIS, DEL Library, DEALS File (codified at DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570-76 (Supp. 1998)).
149.
See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 43-5-8 (Michie 1997).
150.
See ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.050(a)(3) (Lexis 1998). Prior to the 1997
amendments, Alaska law already had liberal perpetuities rules. See id.
§ 34.27.050(a)(1)-(a)(2). The amendment totally eliminates perpetuities concerns
provided the trust instrument allows that "all or part of the income or principal of
the trust may be distributed, in the discretion of the trustee, to a person who is
living when the trust is created." Id. § 34.27.050(a)(3). The amendment adds a
third way for nonvested property interest to be valid. The amended law provides:
"A nonvested property interest is invalid unless: (1) when the interest is created, it
is certain to vest or terminate no later than 21 years after the death of an
individual then alive; (2) the interest either vests or terminates within 90 years
after its creation .... " Id. § 34.27.050(a)(1)-(a)(2). The amendment provides that

852

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 32:831

trust that will not be considered invalid because it is non-vested,
as long as the trustee is granted the discretionary power to

distribute all or part of the income or principal to a beneficiary
who is living at the time the trust is created.-IS Delaware had
previously repealed its perpetuity rules with respect to personal
property held in an irrevocable trust.1 5 2 As a result, a qualified
disposition of personal property in an irrevocable spendthrift
trust will not be subject to any perpetuity rules under Delaware
law.153
The most noteworthy aspects of the amendments are the new
spendthrift provisions. Alaska statute section 34.40.110 and
Delaware Code title 12, section 3570(9)(c) permit the creation of
self-settled spendthrift trusts that will be enforced against the
settlor's creditors providing that the trusts meet certain
requirements. 15 4 The amendments create extremely settlorfriendly rules in varying degrees. 15 5 While the new laws are
similar, there are small differences that affect the amount of
creditor protection that they afford.
1. Alaska
Alaska's statute states: "A person who in writing transfers
property in trust may provide that the interest of a beneficiary of
the trust may not be either voluntarily or involuntarily
transferred before payment or delivery of the interest to the
beneficiary by the trustee."1 5 6 Nothing in the statute, nor in any
other statute, prohibits the settlor from also being named a
beneficiary under the trust instrument.1 5 7 The statute goes on to

a nonvested property interest is valid if- "(3) the interest is in trust and all or part
of the income or principal of the trust may be distributed, in the discretion of the

trustee, to a person who is living when the trust is created." Id. § 34.27.050(a)(3).
151.
See Douglas J. Blattmachr & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, A New Direction
in Estate Planning:North to Alaska, TR. & EST., Sept. 1997, at 48, 52
152.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503(a) (Supp. 1998). As for real estate
held in an irrevocable trust, Delaware law creates a 110 year "wait and see"
period. See id. § 503(b).
153.
See id. § 503(a); id. tit. 12, § 3570(9)(c) (Supp. 1998).
154. ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Lexis 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12,

§ 3570(9)(c) (Supp. 1998).
155.
See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12,
§ 3570-76. The prior Alaska law stated: "A deed of gift, a conveyance or a transfer
or assignment, oral or written, of goods and chattels or things in action made in
trust for the person making the deed, conveyance, transfer, or assignment is void
as against creditors, existing or subsequent, of the person." ALASKA STAT.
§ 34.40.110 (repealed 1997), availablein LEXIS, CODES Library, AK1996 File.
156.
ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(a) (Lexis 1998).
157.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 11, at 191; see also ALASKA STAT.
§ 34.40.110(b) (specifically allowing the settlor to receive distributions from trust

in certain circumstances).
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make it clear that neither current nor future creditors may reach

a beneficiary's interest in trust.158 "If a trust contains a transfer
restriction allowed under (a) of this section, the transfer
restriction prevents a creditor existing when the trust is created,
a person who subsequently becomes a creditor, or another
person from satisfying a claim out of the beneficiary's interest in
the trust."15 9
However, a beneficiary's interest will not be protected under
all circumstances.160
The Alaska amendments set out four
situations in which the assets will not be protected from a
beneficiary's creditors. 16 1 The trust's spendthrift provision will
not be enforced if: 1) the transfer was fraudulent according to
Alaska law; 2) the trust allows the settlor to revoke or terminate
the trust without the consent of an adverse party; 3) the trust
requires that all or part of the income or principal, or both, must
be distributed to the settlor; or 4) at the time of the transfer into
trust, the settlor is in default of making a payment due under a
child support judgment by thirty days or more. 16 2 Conversely,
the settlor's creditors will not be able to reach the trust assets if:
(1) the settlor is not in default in making a child support payment
by thirty days or more; (2) the transfer was not fraudulent as to
the settlor's creditors under Alaska law; (3) the settlor does not
retain the power to revoke or terminate the trust without the
consent of an adverse party; and (4) the settlor is not entitled to
mandatory trust distributions but only eligible to receive a
16 3
distribution upon the discretion of the trustee.
The Alaska Trust Act also includes a jurisdictional claim over
trusts created under its Alaska laws by providing that an Alaska
choice of law provision will be deemed valid. 1'
However, it also
imposes rules as to how a trust must be structured in order for it
to qualify as Alaskan and benefit from the choice of law
provisions. 1 65 The Act requires: 1) "some or all of the trust assets

are deposited in this state and are being administered by a
qualified person;" 2) the "trustee is a qualified person who is

158.
159.

See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.1 1O(b)(1)-(b)(4).
Id. § 34.40.110(b).

160. See id. § 34.40.1 10(b)(1)-(b)(4).
161. See id.
162. See id. The statute defines an adverse party as one "who has a
substantial beneficial interest in the trust and the interest would be adversely
affected by the exercise of the power held by the settlor to revoke or terminate all
or part of the trust." See id. § 34.40.110(b)(2).
163. See Blattmachr & Blattmachr, supra note 151, at 52; Jonathan G.
Blattmachr, Unique Protection Under Alaska Law: Americans In All States Can
Benefit, N.Y. L. J., Sept. 2, 1997, at 1 [hereinafter Blattmachr, Unique Protection].
164. See generally ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.035 (Lexis 1998).
165.
See id. § 13.36.035(c).
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designated as a trustee;" 3) the trustee's powers must include
maintaining records for the trust and "preparing or arranging for

the preparation of... an income tax return;" and 4) at least part
of the trust administration occurs in state, "including physically
maintaining trust records" in state. 166
The Act also limits the rights of creditors who wish to
challenge the trust.16 7 If the trust meets all the requirements of
Alaska statute section 34.40.110, a creditor may not challenge a
transfer into trust or have it voided on the grounds "that the trust
or transfer avoids or defeats a right, claim, or interest conferred
by law on person by reason of a personal or business relationship
with the settlor or by way of a marital or similar right."168 In
addition, the Act limits the time in which a creditor may raise a
claim to have a transfer into an Alaska trust set aside. A creditor
with a claim that existed at the creation of the trust must bring a
claim within four years of the transfer or "one year after the
transfer is or reasonably could have been discovered .... "169
One who becomes a creditor subsequent to the transfer only has
four years after the transfer is actually made to bring an action,
regardless of when it was reasonably discoverable. 170
In addition to limiting the amount of time creditors have to
raise claims, the Act also limits when a transfer will be deemed
fraudulent.171 Alaska's fraudulent transfer statute dictates that

166.

Id. § 13.36.035c)(I)-(c)(4). A "qualified person" includes

(A) an individual who.., resides in this state, whose true and permanent
home is in this state, who does not have a present intention of moving
from this state, ...
;
(B) a trust company that is organized under AS 06.25 and that has its
principal place of business in this state; or

(C) a bank that is organized under AS 06.05, or a national banking
association that is organized under 12 U.S.C. 21-216d, if the bank or
national banking association possesses and exercises trust powers and
has its principal place of business in this state ....
Id. § 13.36.390(l).
167.
See Blattmachr & Hompesch, supranote 143, at 34.
168.
ALAsKA STAT. § 13.36.310 (Lexis 1998).
169.
Id. § 34.40.110(d)(1).
170.
See id. § 34.40.1 10(d)(2).
171.
See id. § 34.40.010. The statute provides:
[A] conveyance or assignment, in writing or otherwise, of an estate or
interest in land, or in goods, or things in action, or of rents or profits
issuing from them or a charge upon land, goods, or things in action, or
upon rents or profits from them, made with intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud creditors or other persons of their lawful suits, damages,
forfeitures, debts, or demands, or a bond or other evidence of debt given,
action commenced, decree or judgment suffered, with the like intent, as
against persons so hindered, delayed, or defrauded is void.

1999]

LAW FOR SALE

a conveyance of property is fraudulent if made "with the intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or other persons of their lawful
suits ....

"172

The statute does not allow the use of what are

referred to as the "badges of fraud" to be considered in proving
intent. 17 3 Thus, it appears to codify the position that
constructive fraud will not be grounds for voiding transaction
where actual intent is not found. Requirig actual fraudulent
intent makes it much harder for creditors to succeed in a
fraudulent challenge claim, since a settlor's actual intent is
difficult to know and prove. It remains to be seen whether courts
will allow transfers to be voided on a theory of constructive fraud.
2. Delaware
Similarly, Delaware's amendments allow the creation of a
trust in which "the interest of a beneficiary in the trust property
or the income therefrom may not be transferred or assigned,
whether voluntarily or involuntarily, before the trustee distributes
the property or income to the beneficiary." 17 4 Delaware enacted a
statute of limitations regarding challenges to transfers into trusts
similar to the Alaska statute.' 75 Delaware law requires a trustee
to be either a natural person who is a resident of the state or an
institutional trustee that is "authorized by the law of this State to
act as a trustee and whose activities are subject to supervision by
the Bank Commissioner of the State .. ."176 Delaware deviated
from Alaska's spendthrift scheme by requiring that the trustee be

"neither the transferor nor a related or subordinate party of the

transferor." 177 Such a requirement offers added protection to the
trust by ensuring that the trustee is truly independent from the
8
settlor.17
The Delaware legislation made a few significant changes to
the Alaskan scheme, which allow broader recovery than the

Id.
172.
Id. If a conveyance is found to be fraudulent the remedy is that the
transfer is void as to creditors. See id
173.
See generallyid.
174.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(9)(c) (Supp. 1998).
175.
See id. § 3572(b). See also Blattmachr & Hompesch, supranote 143, at

35.
176.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(8)(a). Although similar to the Alaska
provision, this provision is more flexible than Alaska's provision, which requires
an individual trustee to be domiciled in Alaska, not merely reside there, and an
institutional trustee must maintain its principal place of business in the state.
ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.010 (Lexis 1998).
177.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 § 3570(9)(b) (Supp.1998).
178.
See Blattmachr & Hompesch, supranote 143, at 35.
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Alaska law. 179 Delaware's fraudulent conveyance laws permit
recovery of both intentionally and constructively fraudulent
transfers.180 The statute specifically codifies circumstances in
which a transfer will be deemed fraudulent even where actual
intent to defraud cannot be proven. 18s
In addition, Delaware law carves out special circumstances
in which the spendthrift provision will not apply.' 82 It added a
provision that creates a class of preferred creditors, which is not
found in the Alaska Act. 183 This class includes the settlor's
spouse and children, and
any person who suffers death, personal injury or property damage
on or before the date of a qualified disposition by a transferor,
which... is at any time determined to have been caused in whole
or in part by the act or omission of either such transferor or by
another person for whom such transferor is or was vicariously
18 4
liable.

This provision is in stark contrast to Alaska's scheme.' 8s The
Delaware provisions allow children of the settlor as well as
current, former, or future spouses to invade a self-settled
spendthrift trust in order to satisfy court awarded claims against
the settlor. 86 Delaware also allows a party injured by the
settlor's acts or omissions, occurring before the settlor made the
qualified disposition, to invade the trust.'8 7

Invasion will be

allowed even if the settlor was unaware of the injury and the
creditor did not claim that the transfer was fraudulent.

88

Such

invasions are not provided for under the Alaska Act. As long as

all the trust requirements are met and the transfer of assets into
trust was not fraudulent, Alaska law will not recognize any class
179.
180.
181.

See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 1304 (Supp.1996).
See id.
See id.

182.

See id. tit. 12, § 3573 (Supp. 1998).

183.
184.

See id.
Id.

185. See Blattmachr & Hompesch, supranote 143, at 38.
186. See id. at 35. For example, H is unmarried and has no children and no
debts. See id. at 36. He inherits $3 million and transfers $1 million into a selfsettled spendthrift trust naming himself and his brother as beneficiaries. See id.
Later, H marries W and they have a child. See id. Together they make
unprofitable investments, and W loses all of her assets that are not in the trust.
See id. H and W divorce; a court awards W custody of their child, orders H to pay
alimony and child support, and $200,000 for division of marital property. See id.
Under Delaware law, W would be able to invade H's trust in order to satisfy her
claim for alimony, child support, and marital property, regardless of whether the
initial transfer of assets into the trust was fraudulent. See id. Under Alaska law
W would not be able to invade a trust so long as it met all the requirements under
the Alaska Trust Act. See icd
187. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 § 3573 (Supp. 1998).
188. See Blattmachr & Hompesch, supranote 143, at 38.
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of special claimants.1 8 9 However, the Delaware exceptions will
not protect subsequent tort victims/creditors who cannot avoid
injury by diligence, and subsequent contract creditors whose
debts are not induced by reliance on the settlor's claim that the
trust assets would be available. 190
B. Legislative History: What PurposesDid the Legislatures
Have In Mind?
Prior to the passage of the Alaska Trust Act, Delaware had
some of the best trust laws of any state and was one of the
leaders in the domestic trust industry. 19 1 Alaska sought to
attract the trust business by enacting more favorable asset
protection legislation. 192 Alaska was the first of the two states to
pass legislation that specifically allows self-settled spendthrift
trusts and limits creditor access to such trusts.1 9 3 Delaware
followed just three months later with a very similar statutory
scheme.
1. Alaska
It seems clear that the motivation behind the Alaska
legislature's passage of the Alaska Trust Act was to stimulate the
state's economy. 19 4 The Act's proponents hoped to encourage
financial markets to headquarter in Alaska by establishing Alaska

189.
See id. For example, successful surgeon S has a net worth of $5
million has a $5 million malpractice insurance policy and no debts. See id. In
1999 S transfers $1 million to a self-settled spendthrift trust naming herself, her
spouse, and her children as beneficiaries. See id. Subsequently, S experiences
financial trouble and loses all her wealth that is not in trust. See id. In 2002 a
patient S treated in 1998 discovers that S caused him injuries that could not
reasonably have been discovered sooner. See id. S was unaware that she had
caused any injury. See id. Patient is awarded a $2 million judgment against S.
See id- In this case, the patient would be entitled to invade a Delaware trust to
satisfy his judgment. See id. Conversely, under Alaska law, the patient would not
be entitled to invade the trust. See id.
190.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 11, at 231.
191.
See Blattmachr & Hompesch, supra note 143, at 38. South Dakota
shared this status with Delaware. See id.
192.
See id. at 32.
193.
See id.
194.
See Trusts and Property Transfers in Trust: Hearing on HB 101 Before
the House Labor and Commerce Standing Comm. 20th Legis., 1st Sess. (Alaska
1997), available at <http://www.legis.state.ak.us> (visited Jan. 29, 1999)
[hereinafter House Trusts Hearings];Trusts and PropertyTransfers in Trust: Hearing
on HB 101 Before the Senate JudiciaryComm., 20th Legis., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1997)
available at <http://www.legis.state.ak.us> (visited Jan. 29, 1999) [hereinafter
Senate Trusts Hearings].
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as an attractive place to administer large trusts. 9 s With
economic growth as their objective and the trust industry as their
means to achieve it, the drafters attempted to write legislation

that would effectively compete with the foreign jurisdictions. 196

The drafters' and legislators' intended for the Act to appeal to

asset protectors. 1 97 Outside of attracting state revenue

(by

catering to the asset protection market), the drafters and
legislators did not express other goals. 198 The legislators seemed

to understand the necessity that the Act enable asset protection
against creditors' claims, yet they did not contemplate the effect
of asset protection on creditors other than spouses and
children. 1 9 9 While these are obviously important concerns, it is
noteworthy that the legislators did not debate the legitimacy of
asset protection or explore what effect these measures might have

on legitimate creditors. 20 0 Moreover, despite the legislators
concern for children and spouses, the Act as passed still allows a
settlor to effectively defraud his children or spouse. 20 1
The drafters of the Act, as well as the legislators that passed
it, were very well aware of the amount of wealth transferred from

U.S. settlors into offshore trusts. They saw the positive effects of
this wealth on the economies of those jurisdictions and wanted to
bring those benefits into Alaska. 20 2

They were also aware that

these foreign jurisdictions experienced such success in the trust

industry because they were able to meet the demands of asset
195.

See House Trusts Hearings,supranote 194 (Tape 97-9, Side A, No. 085)

(statement of Representative Al Vezey).
196.
See generally Fraser, supra note 6, at 1.
197.
See House Trusts Hearings,supranote 194 (Tape 97-9, Side A, No. 085)
(statement of Rep. Al Vezey); Senate Trusts Hearings, supra note 194 (Tape 97-17,
Side A, No. 001) (statement of Rep. Al Vezey).
198.
See generally House Trusts Hearings, supra note 194; Senate Trusts
Hearings, supranote 194.
199.
See generally House Trusts Hearings, supra note 194; Senate Trusts
Hearings, supranote 194.
200.
See generally House Trusts Hearings, supra note 194; Senate Trusts
Hearings, supra note 194. An accountant did testify before the legislators that
creditors would not be defrauded by the Act because lenders should inquire into
what type of assets a beneficiary has before engaging in a transaction. See House
Trusts Hearings, supra note 194 (Tape 97-9, Side B, No. 909) (statement of Kevin
Walsh, CPA). However, this does nothing to protect involuntary creditors. See
discussion supra notes 53-54 accompanying text.
201.
See infra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
202. They used the Cook Islands as an example of what could happen in
Alaska. See House Trusts Hearings, supranote 194 (Tape 97-9, Side B, Nos. 001577) (statements of Rich Hompesch, attorney, Robert Manley, attorney, and Rep.
Al Vezey). After the passage of laws that favored asset protection trusts in the
Cook Islands, rich and famous people started going there and a market for luxury
accommodations sprung up. See id. In addition, an attorney testified that he was
told at a conference he attended that an estimated $200-$300 billion has been
transferred to foreign trusts over the past twenty years. See id.
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protectors. 20 3 In order to compete with the foreign jurisdictions,
their laws had to meet these demands also.
Representative Vezey, the bill's sponsor, identified a trend in
the past one hundred years of U.S. trust law of making trusts
weaker by allowing them to be invaded by creditors. 2 ° 4 He
attributed the trend in U.S. law to the frequent invasion of trusts
by "so called creditors" who may have become creditors long after
the trust's creation. 20 5 He described how courts use the term
"fraudulent transfer" to characterize a conveyance of assets into
trust that may have occurred prior to the transaction that
resulted in the settlor's debt, to justify invading the trust.20 6 His
push for legislation opposed to this trend illustrates his belief
that such invasion of trusts should be stopped. He stated that as
a result of this trend there is a component of the trust market
that is looking for strong protection of the trust corpus from
invasion by creditors.2 0 7
He asserted that Alaska had the
opportunity to allow strong trusts to be created which would be
very difficult to invade. 20 8 He noted that there existed a huge
market for trusts that allowed people to preserve large assets and
that most of this market went to foreign jurisdictions, which have
strong trust laws. 20 9 Vezey explained that such trusts would
bring substantial income to Alaska in the form of administration
fees and that the ripple effect to the state's economy would be
very desirable. 21 0 An attorney specializing in estate tax and
planning testified that the Act would attract business to Alaska
that would primarily benefit attorneys, bankers, certified public
accountants, and money managers. However, the attorney also
noted that money from this business would permeate the Alaskan
21
economy. '

203. See generally id.
204. See id. (Tape 97-9, Side A, No. 085) (statement of Rep. Al Vezey).
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See Senate Trusts Hearings, supra note 194 (Tape 97-17, Side A, No.
001) (statement of Rep. Al Vezey). Rep. Vezey noted that extreme care must be
taken to ensure that no fraudulent transfers occur in the creation of these trusts
and that there is no intent to defraud future creditors. See id. This sounds good,
and apparently this persuaded the other legislators, but to a certain extent asset

protection is on its face an attempt to defraud future creditors.
208. See House Trusts Hearings, supranote 194 (Tape 97-9, Side A, No. 326)
(statement of Rep. Al Vezey).
209. See id.
210. See ic. (Tape 97-9, Side A, Nos. 615-1147) (statements of Rep. Al
Vezey).
211. See id. (Tape 97-9, Side B, Nos. 433-671) (statement of Robert Manley,
attorney). In addition, Mr. Hompesch, a Fairbanks attorney, testified that he
traveled to the Cook Islands to investigate its trust business and that in its
population of 10,000, approximately 150 jobs were attributable to its trust

860

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 32:831

The legislators were also aware of the policy implications
arising from the Act's primary intent to allow the formation of
trusts to shield assets from creditors. A prominent trust and
estate attorney testified that the bill allowed settlors to create
trusts in which their creditors cannot force the invasion of the
trust to satisfy a debt so long as the initial conveyance was not
fraudulent and the statute of repose had not expired. 2 12 He
compared the bill's provisions to the laws of offshore
jurisdictions, which have resulted in billions of dollars to those
jurisdictions. 2 13 Alaska's Assistant Attorney General testified that

protection against creditors' claims is the apparent intent of such

trusts. 2 14 The Assistant Attorney General also pointed out the
legal fiction that a settlor who is also an income beneficiary is no
2 15
longer the legal owner of the trust assets.
A similar bill had been introduced the prior year but was
vetoed by the Governor's Administration due to concerns that the
trusts could be used to avoid child support payments.2 1 6 The
previous bill passed both the House and Senate with only one
opposition vote in each chamber.2 1 7 Upon questioning about the
prior bill's veto, Rep. Vezey replied that it required a vivid
imagination to believe that the trusts could be used to avoid child
support payments and that the bill had been amended to
explicitly address the issue.2 18 However, there was doubt
expressed as to whether the current version of the bill adequately
addressed this issue.2 19 Even though the legislators were aware
of this potential problem, the bill as still passed room for settlors
to avoid child support obligations in some cases. For the trust to
avoid invasion, the statute only requires that the settlor is not in
default by thirty or more days in child support payments at the
time of the transfer. 22 0 So if the settlor is in default of a child

industry. See Senate Trusts Hearings, supra note 194 (Tape 97-17, Side A, No.
001) (statement of Rich Hompesch, attorney). He also predicted that not only will
people want to create such Alaskan trusts but that people will want to travel to
Alaska thus enhancing its tourism market. See fi.
212. See i. (Tape 97-17, Side A, No. 225) (statement of Robert Manley,
attorney). This could leave some legitimate contract or tort creditors of the settlor
unsatisfied. Requiring that the initial conveyance not be fraudulent does not
protect the effect of leaving such legitimate creditors uncompensated.

213.

See id.

214.

See House Trusts Hearings, supra note 194 (Tape 97-9, Side A, No.

1645) (statement of Vincent Usera, Assistant Attorney General).
215.
See . (Tape 97-9, Side A, No. 2027) (statement of Vincent Usera).
216. See id. (Tape 97-9, Side A, No. 560) (statement of Rep. Al Vezey).
217. See id.(Tape 97-9, Side A, No. 326) (statement of Rep. Al Vezey).
218.
See id. (Tape 97-9, Side A, Nos. 560-615) (statements of Rep. Al Vezey).
219.
See infra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
220. See House Trusts Hearings, supra note 194 (Tape 97-9, Side A, No.
1347) (statement of Vincent Usera, Assistant Attorney General).
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support payment by less than thirty days at the time a transfer is
made to the trust and the settlor subsequently stops paying child
support, the trust corpus would not be invaded for the child's
support. This does not seem like an adequate solution to the risk
of people using these trusts to defraud their children.
The Assistant Attorney General actually brought this problem
to the legislators' attention. He pointed out that a child could be
born' after the creation of the trust and could be cut off
entirely.2 2 1 In addition, if someone wanted to use the trust as a
way to avoid child support payments, he would merely have to be
222
up to date on those payments at the time he created the trust.
However, the Assistant Attorney General speculated that anyone
who has the assets required to set up this type of trust is not
likely to have the intentions of avoiding child support
obligations. 22 3 Nevertheless, he also acknowledged that if the
statute is too vague it could be used to avoid such obligations
224
and that "people do this sort of thing all the time."

There seemed to be some confusion regarding the tax effects
of these trusts. The Assistant Attorney General stated that the
trust would shield the assets from creditors, including the
I.R.S., 2 2 S while an attorney who worked on drafting the bill stated
that it was drafted so that money put in the trust would be a
completed gift for I.R.S. purposes.2 2 6 If the trust were invadable
by creditors (i.e., for child support) then it will not be a completed
gift and it would be subject to invasion by anyone. 2 27 He
explained that this was the reason for the thirty day rule on child
support obligation.2 28 He said the bill was specifically drafted to
not allow invasion of the trust once created because by allowing
even limited invasion it opened the trust up for attack by any and
all creditors. 22 9 As a result, the statute is worded so that if a
settlor is in default by thirty or more days on child support
payments at the time of the transfer, the transfer is considered
void. 23 0 This may achieve the benefits of the asset protection but
it does not adequately protect children who may be entitled to

221.
See id.
222.
See id.
223.
See id. (Tape 97-9, Side A, No. 1965) (statement of Vincent Usera,
Assistant Attorney General)
224.
See id.
225.
See id. (Tape 97-9, Side A, No.1645) (statement of Vincent Usera,
Assistant Attorney General).
226.
See iU. (Tape 97-9, Side A, No. 2138) (statement of Dick Thwaites,

attorney).
227.
228.
229.
230.

See idU
See iU.
See id.
See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(b)(4) (Lexis 1998).
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child support payments from the settlor. The drafters and
legislators apparently were convinced that no injustice would
occur, because Alaska courts would be deciding such cases so
they could make the subsequent changes if necessary. 2 3 '
The bill was clearly intended to completely shield these trusts
from any claims of creditors. One attorney testified that the trust
may not be invaded for child support obligations because if that
were the case the entire trust would be included in the settlor's
estate and this would provide little incentive for anyone to set up
such a trust.2 3 2 He also justified the child support provisions of
the bill by explaining that a deadbeat father would not use these
trusts as a way of defrauding children because of the cost of
setting up the trust. He claimed that type of people setting up
these trusts would not use these instruments as a method of
3
defrauding their families. 23
The legislators were cautioned against having high

expectations of the bill ensuring asset protection and bringing
money from offshore jurisdictions into Alaska. 23 4 It was
explained that these offshore jurisdictions have entirely separate

sovereignty, whereas Alaska does not.2 35 Alaska is subject to the

Full Faith and Credit clause of the U.S. Constitution, and it
remains to be seen whether people seeking asset protection will
find Alaska more appealing than offshore jurisdictions.2 36
Rep. Vezey testified that among the people he surveyed he
did not find anyone opposed to the bill. 23 7 In fact the committee

minutes are replete with favorable endorsements of the bill by
members of Alaska's professional industry.2 3 8 However, as Rep.
Vezey acknowledged, his survey was limited to insurance
companies, banks, and various trust officers. 2 3 9 Also, the
endorsements all came from these groups or other similar
professionals such as attorneys and accountants. 2 40 All the
people that testified before the legislature had a lot to gain by the

231.
See House Trusts Hearings, supra note 194 (Tape 97-9, Side A, No.
2138) (statement of Dick Thwaites, attorney).
232.
See id. (Tape 97-9, Side B, No. 070) (statement of Rich Hompesch,
attorney).
233.
See id. (Tape 97-9, Side B, No. 136) (statement of Rich Hompesch).
234.
See Senate Trusts Hearings, supra note 194 (Tape 97-17, Side A,
No.276) (statement of Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum).
235.
See id.

236.
237.

See id.
See House Trusts Hearings,supranote 194 (Tape 97-9, Side A, No. 326)

(statement of Rep. Al Vezey).

238. See id.See generally Senate Trusts Hearings, supranote 194.
239. See House Trusts Hearings,supranote 194 (Tape 97-9, Side A, No. 326)
(statement of Rep. Al Vezey).
240. See id.
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bill's passage. For example, an investment firm manager testified
that such firms are generally supportive of the bill because it
would create more high-end jobs which would benefit everyone as
Alaska becomes more business-friendly. 2 4 1 In turn, the manager
predicted that ff Alaska has a business-friendly image it would
encourage people to buy second homes in the state. 24 2 Financial
consultants, CPAs, and attorneys strongly supported the bill for
the investment money it would bring, its benefit to Alaska's
business community, and the general economic advantages it
would bring to Alaska. 24 These advocates of the bill also urged
that if Alaska did not take this opportunity another state would
24
take the lead in this area. "

An accountant, who testified before the legislature, stated
that future creditors of a settlor/beneficiary would not be
defrauded. According to this testimony, a lender should
investigate the beneficiary's assets before engaging in a
transaction. 2 45 This of course speaks only to creditors that are
lenders and ignores many other classes of creditors such as
spouses, children, tort victims, etc. He also analogized the use of
this type of a trust to other types of transactions that could have
a detrimental effect on creditors, such as gifts to charity, transfer
of assets to family members, and purchasing insurance
policies.24s
However, one very important difference between
these transactions and the use of a self-settled spendthrift trust
is that this type of a trust would allow the settlor to make the
transfer and continue to receive income distributions. 2 4 7 This
would not be the case with any of the aforementioned
alternatives.
This CPA also testified that Alaska needed to
provide a means of asset protection, recognizing the litigious
climate of the country right now, which causes people to worry
about providing for future generations. 24 8 If providing for future
generations is really the concern, there are already effective

241.
See Senate Trusts Hearings, supra note 194 (Tape 97-17, Side A, No.
329) (statement of Allan Johnston, securities manager).
242.
See id.
243.
See id. (Tape 97-17, Side A, No. 381) (statements of Diane Borgeson,
financial consultant, Jo Kuchle, E.M. Cox, CPA, & Shelley Ebenal, attorney).
244.
See ic.
245.
See House Trusts Hearings, supra note 194 (Tape 97-9, Side B, No.

909) (statement of Kevin Walsh, CPA).
246.

See id. Although he followed this by saying he did not think these

trusts do work to the detriment of future creditors. See id.
247.
See Blattmachr, supra note 144, at 8. See generally ALASKA STAT.
§ 34.40.110 (Lexis 1998).
248.
See House Trusts Hearings, supra note 194 (Tape 97-9, Side B, No.
1068) (statement of Kevin Walsh, CPA).
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means of doing so; this legislation tries not only to provide for the
future but to allow for the current enjoyment as well.
The Alaska legislators were particularly interested in how
exactly these amendments would bring revenue into the state.
They expressed concern that the statute's requirement that "some
or all of the trust assets be deposited" in Alaska would not ensure
that a significant amount of the assets will be deposited in
state. 2 49 They suggested requiring a particular percentage of the
assets be deposited in Alaska. 25 0 However, an attorney who
worked on the bill testified that the revenue would come to
Alaska through the administration fees which would be based on
the total value of the trust, not just what is located in the
state. 25 1 In addition, any legal issues resulting from such a trust
would require consultation with an Alaskan attorney, and any
litigation that the trusts generated in the Alaska courts would be
25 2
economically beneficial to the Alaska judicial system.
The representatives also voiced some concern over the
possibility of a grantor being able to do what some may think is
"immoral," such as disinheriting a spouse or other family
members.2 5 3 They were placated by testimony that under Alaska
law it is prohibited to completely disinherit a spouse and that
spouses are entitled to an elective share of the decedent spouse's
augmented estate. 2 54 The bill was specifically amended to make
these trusts part of the augmented estate. 2 5 While this protects
one who is the settlor's spouse at the time of settlor's death, this
does nothing to protect former spouses to whom alimony is owed
25 6
or children of the settlor who may be entitled to child support.

249. See id. (Tape 97-9, Side B, Nos. 1296-1425) (statements of Dick
Thwaites, attorney). The representatives were worried that a settlor could arrange
for only one dollar to be deposited in Alaska and that little revenue would be
brought into the state if that was allowable. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id. (Tape 97-9, Side B, No. 1425) (statement of Rep. Al Vezey).
252. See id. (Tape 97-9, Side B, No.1296) (statement of Chairman Rokeberg).
It should be noted that the Executive Committee of the Probate and Planning
Section of the Alaska Bar did not take a position on the bill because they would
have to go to the Board of Governors of the Bar Association. See id. (Tape 97-9,
Side B, No. 1750) (statement of Chairman Rokeberg). Apparently this process was
time-consuming and wouldn't occur before the legislative session was over. The
Assistant Attorney General pointed out that his office should not be perceived as
attacking the bill. See i. He said there are no estate or taxation attorneys in the
Department of Law and that there is no need for any attorneys. See id. In

addition, there is no state agency that has any oversight responsibility for this bill;
his office was merely asked to review and report on it. See id.
253. See id. (Tape 97-9, Side B, No.2108) (statement of Chairman Rokeberg).
254. See id. (statement of Robert Manley, attorney).
255. See id.
256. See generally ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Lexis 1998) (lacking any
protection for former spouses and only protecting children by requiring the settlor
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2. Delaware
Just three months later, Delaware enacted legislation similar
to the Alaska statute with small, but not insignificant
differences. 25 7 Delaware's reaction of modeling its Qualified
Dispositions in Trust Act after the Alaska legislation may be seen
as legitimizing the use of domestic trusts to protect assets from
creditors. 2 58 However, the Delaware legislation contains
exceptions for certain classes of claimants and reflects an attempt
to adhere to what has been the traditional public policy in the
United States. Such adherence, in the face of Alaska's attempt to
move away from fundamental U.S. notions of public policy,
makes the Alaska legislature's disregard for fairness even clearer.
The drafters of Delaware's legislation expressly stated their
intent to maintain Delaware's status as "the most favored
domestic jurisdiction for the establishment of trusts."25 9 The
legislators also stated that the purpose of the Act was to allow
trust settlors to transfer assets from their estates in order to
reduce the federal estate taxes that otherwise would be due upon
their death.26 0 They realized that in order to accomplish this a
settlor could not retain any enforceable rights to the income or
principal of the trust but that the settlor could receive
discretionary distributions as a beneficiary.2 6 1 They also realized
that the trusts could not be subject to the settlor's creditors'
claims in order to have the trust assets excluded from the
settlor's estate for tax purposes.2 6 2 This declaration of the

not be in default of child support payments by more than thirty days); id.
§ 13.36.310 (stating that other than as specified in § 34.40.110 trusts cannot be
voided on the basis that their existence avoids a marital obligation of the settlor).
257.
See Blattmachr & Hompesch, supra note 143, at 32.
Governor
Knowles approved The Alaska Trust Act on April 1, 1997. See Alaska Trust Act

ch. 6, 1997 Alaska. Sess. Laws 6, available in LEXIS, ALAS Library, AKALS File
(codified at ALAsKA STAT. §§ 13.12.205(2), 13.36.035(a), 13.36.035(c)-(d),
13.36.045(a), 13.36.310, 13.36.390. 34.27.050(a), 34.40.010, 34.40.110).
Governor Carter approved the Qualified Dispositions in Trust amendments to
Delaware law on July 9, 1997. See Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act, Pub. Act
159, 71 Del. Laws 159 (1997), available in LEXIS, DEL Library, DEALS File
(codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570-76).

258.
259.
Laws 159
260.

See Blattmachr & Hompesch, supranote 143, at 38.
Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act, Synopsis, Pub. Act 159, 71 Del.
(1997), available in LEXIS, DEL Library, DEALS File
See ic.

261.

See id.

262.

See id.

However, they went on to list three situations in which

creditors may reach the trust assets. See id
renders the trusts subject to:

The synopsis states that the Act

(1) obligations to children, spouses and former spouses under a domestic
agreement or court order, (2) obligations to any creditor who was induced
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legislators' purposes in enacting the Act and their intentions as to

what they sought to accomplish underscores that providing
effective asset protection through the enforcement of self-settled
spendthrift trusts was the bottom line goal. In order to compete
with Alaska for trust business, which seeks to compete with

offshore jurisdictions, Delaware had to enact legislation similarly
beneficial to asset protection.

IV. WILL THE ALASKA AND DELAWARE STATUTES
ACHIEVE THEIR DESIRED GoALS?

There has been a good deal of speculation as to whether a
creditor will be able to successfully invade an Alaska or Delaware
self-settled spendthrift trust. Supporters of the new legislation
expound the asset protection guarantees of the new laws. 2 63

While they quietly recognize what they deem to be the small
potential for creditors to gain access to assets placed in the new

trusts, they tend to gloss over this risk without thorough
analysis. 2 6

It is not surprising that the most ardent and

vociferous supporters of these new laws are the same individuals
responsible for their passage. Other experts in the field of estate
planning and asset protection have been a bit more skeptical
about the effectiveness of the new trusts. 26 5 While supporters

by a settlor to extend credit on the strength of the settlor's financial
statement or other written representation that the trust assets were
available to satisfy the debt; and (3) claims arising out of fraudulent
transfers if such claims are brought within the time limits provided for in
this Act.

Id.
263. See generally Blattmachr & Blattmachr, supra note 151, at 48;
Blattmachr, Unique Protection, supranote 163, at 7; Blattmachr, supra note 144,
atS.
264. See generally Blattmachr & Blattmachr, supra note 151, at 48;
Blattmachr, Unique Protection, supranote 163, at 7; Blattmachr, supra note 144,
at 8.
265. See A. Barry Nelson & Rosario Ferrero Carr, Drafting to Achieve
Maximum Flexibility in the Estate Plan, 25 EST. PLAN. 252, 255 (1998) (cautioning
potential clients that there is no guarantee that the purported asset protection
benefits of the Alaska and Delaware trust will actually be obtainable, and
recommending a conservative approach regarding these trusts until the waters
have been tested); Alson R. Martin, Recent Developments in Tax, Employee
Benefits, and Business Law, in SC58 PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, QUALIFIED
PLANS, HEALTH CARE, AND WELFARE BENEFITS 1, 118 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study
1998) (stating that Alaska law may not apply to a settlor who lives and does
business outside Alaska, thus making the trusts more vulnerable to creditors'
claims); McMenamin, supra note 6, at 94 (explaining that if a settlor lives in a
state other than Alaska, a creditor or tort claimant could try to sue in the settlor's
state of residence and the court would likely apply that state's law).
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are claiming that the new trusts will replace the need for asset
protectors to look to offshore trusts, critics claim that offshore
266
trusts still offer the best in creditor protection.
A. United States FraudulentConveyance Law-A Threat to the
Success of Alaska and DelawareSelf-Settled
Spendthrift Trusts
Under some states' laws a transfer will be considered
fraudulent, and therefore void as to creditors, if it results in
harming the creditors, even without the transferor having actual
intent to defraud.2 6 7 Under these laws, "constructively
fraudulent" transfers will be found void against a transferor's
creditors. 26 8 A creditor could sue the settlor of an Alaskan trust
in one of these states and have the settlor's transfer of assets into
trust voided if the settlor is harmed by the conveyance, regardless
of the settlor's actual intent. An Alaska court would have to
enforce such a judgment because
of the Full Faith and Credit
26 9
clause of the Constitution.
Fraudulent conveyance law is an extremely important factor

to be considered in asset protection. 70 Its general purpose is to
prevent a debtor from transferring assets out of the reach of his
creditors with the intent or effect of leaving the debtor without
assets to pay legitimate debts.2 7 1 If a transfer made as part of an
asset protection plan is found to be a fraudulent conveyance, the
transferor's creditors may be able to reach the transferred
property. 2 72 A transfer of assets into trust may be vulnerable to
creditor's attacks even if the settlor has only legitimate motives
27 3
for the transfer such as estate planning or tax purposes.

266.
For support for the new legislation see, for example, supra note 263.
For criticism of the new legislation see, for example, supranote 265.
267.
See UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE Ac §§ 4-6, 7A U.L.A. 67,105, 110
(1999) (superseded by the UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, passed in 1984, 7A
U.L.A. 266).
268.
See id. § 4, 7A U.L.A. 67. Only five states and one U.S. territory have
such laws. See id., 7A U.L.A. 2.
269.
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Full Faith and Credit clause is
considered to be a part of each state's conflict of laws rules. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 2 cmt. b (1971).
270.
See LEWIS D. SOLOMON & LEWIS J. SARET, ASSET PROTECTION STRATEGIES,
TAX AND LEGAL ASPECTS, 5-6 (1993). A fraudulent conveyance is a transfer made,
or presumed to be made, with the intent to delay or defraud creditors. See id. at
6. A conveyance made with a lack of fair and valuable consideration may also be
characterized as fraudulent. See d.
271.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supranote 11, at 215.
272.
See SOLOMON & SARET, supra note 270, at 6. This result would
undermine an individual's asset protection plan. See icL
273.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 11, at 215.
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Although Alaska's and Delaware's laws purport to ensure their
respective laws will be applied in determining whether a
fraudulent conveyance occurred, conflict of laws rules may allow
a creditor to sue a debtor in another state and have that state's
law apply.27 4 This is a potential threat to the amount of asset
protection that the new trusts can offer because a creditor could
sue a settlor in a state in which it is easier to prove that a
fraudulent conveyance occurred. 2 75 If a transfer into an Alaska
or Delaware trust is determined by a court to be fraudulent and
therefore void, the creditor may be allowed to collect the amount
of the debt from trust assets.
States generally have adopted one of three models of
fraudulent transfer statutes: the Statute of Elizabeth, the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA), or the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act (UFTA). 27 6 The models provide different standards
for what constitutes a fraudulent conveyance and may yield
different results depending upon which one is applied. All three
models condemn transfers made with actual intent to defraud
voided if it was
creditors; however, a transfer may also 2 be
77
constructively, but not actually, fraudulent.
The Statute of Elizabeth prohibits debtors from making
conveyances with "intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors or
others."2 7 8 This model requires the creditor to prove actual intent
to defraud, and constructively fraudulent transfers are not
voidable.
The UFCA expands the definition of a fraudulent conveyance
to include constructive fraud by reference to the objective effects
of a disposition upon the financial situation of the debtor and his
creditors. 2 79 As a result, transfers having the objective
consequence of harming the debtor's creditors may be found
fraudulent, without regard for the transferor's subjective
intent.28 0 The UFCA makes clear that it applies to present and to
future creditors.281 Thus, a transfer may be voided if it was made

274. See id.
See McMenamin, supranote 6, at 94.
275.
276.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supranote 11, at 217. Nine states rely on statutes
mirroring the Statute of Elizabeth, five states have adopted the UFCA, and thirtysix have adopted the UFTA. See id
See id. at 218.
277.
278. Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 11, at 219 (quoting Statute of Elizabeth, 13
Eliz. 1 ch. 5, § 1 (1571) (Eng.).
279. See ALCES, supranote 59, 5.01[2][b].
280.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supranote 11, at 217.
281. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 7, 7A U.L.A. 113 (1999). The
code states "[e]very conveyance made... with actual intent, as distinguished from
intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future
creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors." Id.
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with the purpose of hindering, delaying, or defrauding someone in
the future, even if the settlor had no debt at the time of the
transfer. 28 2 The UFCA allows constructively fraudulent transfers
to be set aside where a conveyance is made without fair
consideration and leaves the transferor insolvent as to present
creditors. 2 8 3 The UFCA also provides that a conveyance is
fraudulent to both current and future creditors if made without
fair consideration by one who either "intends or believes that he
will incur debts beyond his ability to pay."28 4

These provisions

pose potential problems for asset protectors, because a transfer
made with the intent to protect assets against present or future,
known or unknown, creditors could fall within the language of
28 5
voidable transfers under the UFCA.
The UFTA, like the UFCA, applies to either existing or future
creditors. 28 6 The UFTA also includes a non-exclusive list of
factors that may be used as objective evidence to prove the
debtor's actual intent.28 7 Thus, a settlor's transfer of assets into

282.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supranote 11, at 220.
283.
UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 4, 7A U.L.A. 67. In addition,
UFCA provides that a transfer made without fair consideration by one who is
engaged or about to engage in a transaction for which he will have small
remaining capital is fraudulent with respect to present and future creditors. See
id. § 5, 7A U.L.A. 105. This could apply to a settlor who transfers assets into trust
and then engages in a risky profession, such as heart surgery, without adequate
insurance. See id. § 6, 7A U.L.A. 110.

284.

Id. § 6, 7A U.L.A. 110. This could apply to a settlor who transfers

assets into trust with the expectation that he will incur debts for which he will

have inadequate assets to cover. See Gebbia-Pinetti, supranote 11, at 232.
285. See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 11, at 222; UNIF. FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE AT, § 7, 7A U.L.A. 113.
286. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AT § 4(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 301. The statute
provides that: "A transfer made . . . by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor,
whether that creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made ... , if
the debtor made the transfer . . . : (1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud any creditor of the debtor .... " Id
287. Id. § 4(b), 7A U.L.A. 302.
In determining actual intent under subsection (a)(1), consideration may be
given, among other factors, to whether:
(1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(2) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred
after the transfer;
(3) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(4)before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had
been sued or threatened with suit;
(5) the transfer was of substantially all of the debtor's assets;
(6) the debtor absconded;
(7) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(8) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably
equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the
obligation incurred;
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trust may be constructively fraudulent and therefore voidable if
some of these factors are present, even if the settlor did not have,
or it cannot be proved he had, actual intent.2 8 8 Under these
factors, a transfer in which the debtor retains too great a degree
of possession or control may be suspect. 28 9 A settlor who retains
a beneficial interest in a self-settled trust may be caught in this
category.
B. United States Conflict of Law Rules: A Way to Crack an
Alaska or Delaware Self-Settled Spendthrift Trust
Under conflict of laws rules, if a settlor is domiciled outside
of Alaska or Delaware, a creditor may be able to sue the settlor in
the settlor's state of domicile and persuade the court to apply the
fraudulent conveyance law of that state.2 90 If the creditor
prevailed and a court held that the settlor's transfer of assets into
trust was fraudulent, Alaska and Delaware would most likely
291
have to recognize and enforce such a judgment.
Since the Alaska and Delaware laws narrow the scope of
fraudulent conveyance law as applied to their trusts, it is to the
advantage of a creditor to sue in another state and request that
the court apply the law of that state to determine whether the
transfer of the assets into trust is voidable.2 9 2 The Alaska Trust
Act repealed Alaska's version of the Statute of Elizabeth, which
made transfers to trust for the benefit of the settlor void as to the
settlor's creditors, regardless of whether the creditors' claims
arose before or after the trust's creation. 2 93 The new law provides
that a trust for the benefit of a settlor including a spendthrift

provision prevents a creditor existing at the creation of the trust,
a subsequent creditor, or any other person, from satisfying a
claim with the settlor's interest in the trust.2 94 The law provides

(9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer
was made or the obligation was incurred;
(10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt
was incurred; and
(11) the debtor transferred the essential assets of a business to a lienor
who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
Id. These factors are commonly referred to as the "badges of fraud." See Turner &
Henkel, supranote 14, at 4.
288.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 11, at 215.
289.
See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(b)(2), 7A U.L.A. 302 (1999).
290.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supranote 11, at 215.
291.
See id. at 253. This is due to the Full Faith and Credit clause of the
U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
292. See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 11, at 218.
293.
See Blattmachr & Hompesch, supranote 143, at 34.
294.
See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(a)-(b) (Lexis 1998).
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that the spendthrift provisions will be enforced so long as the
trust meets certain requirements including that the initial
transfer was not fraudulent under Alaska law.2 95

Alaska's and Delaware's laws try to prevent creditors from
suing in other states and from having other states' fraudulent
transfer laws determine whether a transfer of assets into trust
will be set aside. 2 9 6 The new Alaska laws: 1) allow a settlor to
choose Alaska law to govern the trust, and provide that the
settlor's choice of law will be enforced as long as the trust meets
certain conditions; 2) grant Alaska courts exclusive jurisdiction
over trusts that contain valid choice of law provisions; and 3)
require that Alaska law be applied to determine the validity of
Alaska choice of law clauses. 2 97 Likewise, Delaware law allows
the trust instrument to include a Delaware choice of law clause if
the trust meets the requirements of a qualified disposition and
permits, but does not require, the settlor to receive
2 98
distributions.
Whether the benefits of this legislation will be enforced
depends upon whether the settlor's choice of law claim will
withstand a creditor's challenges. A creditor will likely commence
an action challenging the transfer of assets into an Alaska or
Delaware trust in another state in order to avoid Alaska's and
Delaware's rather settlor-friendly laws. The state in which the
creditor brings suit will have to apply its own choice of law rules
to decide whether to apply Alaska or Delaware law, its own law,
or the law of another state to determine the fraudulent transfer
issue. The court will have to decide whether the settlor's choice
of law applies to the fraudulent transfer action and, if so, whether
the court can override that choice. 2 99 It may seem as if this issue
should be analyzed from the perspectives of conflict of laws rules

295.
See id. § 34.40.110(b)(1).
296.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supranote 11, at 237.
297.
See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.035(a), (c)-(d). For the Alaska choice of law
provision to be valid the following four conditions must be met:
(1) some or all of the trust assets are deposited in this state and are being
administered by a qualified person; ....
(2) a trustee is a qualified person who is designated as a trustee under the
governing instrument or by a court having jurisdiction over the trust;
(3) the powers of the trustee ... include...

(A)maintaining records for the trust ... ., and
(B) preparing... income tax return that must be filed by the trust; and
(4) part or all of the administration occurs in this state. ....

Id. § 13.36.035(c).
298. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 §§ 3570(9)(a), 3571 (Supp. 1998).
299.

See Gebbia-Pinetti, supranote 11, at 244.
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with respect to either contracts or trusts. 30 0 However, an action
by a creditor to avoid a transfer of property into trust is neither a
contract issue nor one between the parties of a trust. The
fraudulent transfer cause of action could be characterized as a
quasi-tort claim in which the creditor seeks an equitable
remedy. 30 1 The creditor is asking the court to apply the law of a
state other than Alaska or Delaware because those states have
little relationship to the fraudulent transfer action. 30 2 The scope
of the settlor's choice of law is limited to issues relating to the
internal affairs of the trust and to those ,who are party to the
trust.30

3

Neither the party to a contract nor the settlor of a trust

may bind third parties to their choice of law.304 For this reason,
the state may reject the attempt to bind creditors to the debtor's
choice of law.3 0 5 Once the Alaska and Delaware choice of law has

been rejected, the court will likely apply the law of the state that

30 6
has the most significant relation to the issue being litigated.
Assuming a creditor can convince a court to apply state law
other than Alaska and Delaware and the creditor wins his
fraudulent conveyance cause of action, the next question is
whether Alaska and Delaware will honor such a judgment. Under
the U.S. Constitution, "[flull faith and credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings
of every other State."3 0 7 So, assuming the judgment is valid, it
must be given effect in Alaska and Delaware unless an exception
applies. The Restatement provides defenses that might allow a
state to refuse to enforce the judgment of another.3 0 8 A state
may refuse to enforce another state's judgment if the judgment
improperly interferes with important interests of the state.3 0 9

300.

See id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 186-88 discusses

conflict of laws rules as applied to contracts and §§ 267-82 discusses conflict of
laws rules as applied to trusts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
186-88, 267-82 (1971).
301.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supranote 11, at 247.
302.
See ici The situation is similar to one in which an Illinois debtor gives
assets outright to a friend in Alaska, who both agree that Alaska law will govern
the gift. See id. An Illinois creditor sues the debtor in Illinois for making a
fraudulent conveyance, because the gift left the debtor insolvent and unable to
pay his debt, and asks the court to apply Illinois fraudulent conveyance law. See
id. It is doubtful that a court would force the transferor and transferee's attempt
to bind creditors to Alaska fraudulent transfer law. See id.

303.
See id.
304. See id.
305.
See generally Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 201
Bankr. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996); Ferrari v. Barclays Business Credit, Inc. (In re

Morse Tool, Inc.),108 Bankr. 384 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
306. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
307.
308.
309.

§

6(2) (1971).

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 103-21.
See id. § 103. The RESTATEMENT notes that:
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However, a state must enforce a judgment, even if the original
claim is contrary to a strong public policy of the state in which
enforcement is sought. 3 10 Read together, these rules suggest that
a state must enforce another state's judgment even if the original
claim violates strong public policy of the enforcing state, unless
enforcement would involve an improper interference with the
enforcing state's interests.3 1 The Restatement adds that
"[a]lmost invariably, the federal policy of full faith and credit will
outweigh any interest that a state may have in not recognizing or
enforcing a sister State judgment ....
"312 The only strong state
interest Alaska or Delaware could possibly assert is its desire to
bring trust business into the state or to protect trusts that are
already established under its laws. Based on the legislative
history previously discussed, there is nothing else in the record
It is
that was asserted as a reason for passing the bill.3 13
doubtful that these interests would permit a state to refuse to
enforce another state's judgment.3 1 4 If the trustee refused to
comply with the judgment, he would likely be subject to an order
3 15
of contempt.
C. What to Do? Change the Laws, or Change U.S. Policy?
The Alaska legislature could choose to make its laws
consistent with those of Delaware and with U.S. policy by
enacting an amendment to make an exception for tort victims.
The Restatement lists four specific classes of creditors which
present such compelling public policy claims that they should be
able to reach a spendthrift trust. 3 16 Although tort victims are not
on the enumerated list, the Restatement notes that a spendthrift
trust should also be accessible by the creditor of a beneficiary
when "considerations of public policy so require. Thus it is

[t]he rule of this Section has an extremely narrow scope of application. Full
faith and credit requires, almost invariably, that a valid State judgment be
recognized in sister States, which means that the judgment must be given
the same conclusive effect with respect to the parties, the subject matter of
the action and the issues involved that the judgment would have in the
State of rendition ....
I.

§ 103 cmt. a.

310.

Seeid § 117.

311.
See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 11, at 254.
312.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103 cmt. b.
313.
See generally House Trusts Hearings, supra note 194; Senate Trusts
Hearings, supranote 194.
314.

See Gebbia-Pinetti, supranote 11, at 255.

315.

See id.at 256.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS

316.

§ 157 (1959).
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possible that person who has a claim in tort against the
beneficiary of a spendthrift trust may be able to reach his interest
under trust."3 17 While few cases have addressed the issue of
whether a tort victim should be entitled to invade a trust, those
that have tend to reject making an exception.3 1 8 However,
passed statutes creating an
Georgia and Louisiana 3have
19
exception for tort creditors.
Some have suggested compromise that provides creditors
with a way of obtaining satisfaction on their claims yet also
protects the essence of the spendthrift provision by insulating a
significant portion of the beneficiary's trust interest. 3 20 One
author's proposal for reform stated that she "would retain the
create a valid spendthrift
venerable rule that a settlor 3 2cannot
1
provision for her own benefit."

V. CONCLUSION

The broad purpose behind these legislative amendments is
each state's desire to bolster its economy and bring revenue into
the state. These states decided, as a way to achieve this goal, to
attempt to lure the offshore trust market into their states. They
saw the vast amounts of money and jobs situated in the offshore
jurisdictions with favorable asset protection legislation. In order
to compete with these foreign markets and entice this business
into their states, they sought to mimic the legislation that has
allowed the asset protection industry to flourish in these offshore
havens.
The result of this desire is essentially a marketing strategy
that advertises favorable law to attract wealthy asset protectors.
The problem with this means of raising state revenue is that wellsettled concepts of fairness in creditors' rights issues are being
sacrificed. This has the potential to cause offensive outcomes
where spouses and children of settlors are denied support
payments, and injured victims who have won tort judgments
against settlors are denied compensation. These are results that
have caused criticism of the use of offshore trusts, and yet they
are precisely the same results that will occur if the Alaska and
Delaware legislation accomplishes its intended purpose.

317.
318.
319.

Id. § 157 cmt. a.
See Brooks, supranote 76, at 110.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-28(c)(1) (1997), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2005

(West 1991).
320. See Brooks, supranote 76, at 142-43.
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Emanuel, supranote 61, at 208.
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Since the Alaska and Delaware laws as amended are not very
favorable to creditors, many settlors seeking to protect their
assets will likely create trusts in these states. 3 22 This is in fact
what the lawmakers are hoping will occur. They hope that
earning the reputation as being "asset protection friendly" will act
as an incentive for individuals to create their trusts in these two
states. However, this could result in courts from other states
viewing transfers made to trusts in these states as suspiciously
fraudulent, even if the settlor has legitimate estate planning
3 23
goals.
Some authors and experts in the field have concluded that
the new trust provisions coupled with the fraudulent transfer law
3 24
amendments serve no other purpose than asset protection.
The offshore trust offers the unique combination of asset
protection without having to place the money completely out of

the settlor's control. It is this unique benefit of offshore trusts
that the Alaska and Delaware lawmakers sought to copy.3 25 This
recent legislation could potentially yield the same unfair result as
in the hypothetical mentioned in the introduction. However,
whether the recent legislation will accomplish this unique
combination of benefits to settlors and the potential detriment to
creditors has yet to be tested by a court.3 2 6 Therefore, it remains
to be seen whether the traditional U.S. concepts of fairness will
prevail, or whether the Alaska and Delaware trusts will be
upheld.
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323.
See id. at 215.
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See id. at 260.
325.
See Fraser, supra note 6, at 1. Alaska State Representative Al Vezey,
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